

# Session III: Neighbourhood: Traditional and New Problems of Security

Chair:

**Aleksander Smolar**, President of the Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw

Speakers:

**Heather Grabbe**, Research Director, Centre for European Reform,  
London

**Bronisław Komorowski**, former Minister of Defence of Poland, Warsaw

**Antonio Missiroli**, Senior Research Fellow,  
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris

**Dominique Moïsi**,  
Deputy Director, French Institute of International Research (IFRI), Paris

**Andrey Zagorsky**, Deputy Director,  
Institute for Applied International Research (IAIR), Moscow

Presentation:

**Jacek Cichoński**, Deputy Director, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw

## Aleksander Smolar

President of the Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw

Mr Smolar said at the beginning that issues considered to be the traditional most serious threats to security have been outpaced by new factors in today's world: demographics, trafficking in people, drug trafficking, new types of terrorist attacks.

Mr Smolar discussed the role of EU decisions, including the Schengen *acquis*, in defining borders and cross-border security: in addition to their real significance, they are often perceived as symbols.

Mr Smolar recalled the fundamental dilemma, later discussed by all speakers and guests: How to strike a balance between enforcing border regime as an important part of the security system and the drive towards increased freedom of movement.

## Antonio Missiroli

Senior Research Fellow,  
European Union Institute for Security Studies, Paris

Unlike the OSCE or the Council of Europe, the EU must not water down its nature as it would lose its clout and its attraction to the candidate countries.



Mr Missiroli said that the protection of borders is one of the main functions of each State. The European Union is special in that it applies a unique combination of means: incorporation/enlargement (by request of those interested) and stabilisation of the border areas by way of exerting pressure, signing trade agreements, regional treaties, exporting models. Since the end of the cold war, enlargement has outweighed stabilisation.

Mr Missiroli said that the present enlargement is the most important one, after the ac-

cession of the Mediterranean countries in the 1980s; it will probably lead to the accession of the Balkan countries, which lie between Central Europe and the Mediterranean. Hence, the external borders of the European Union have to be clearly defined and the different status of full EU members and associated countries must not be confused.

Mr Missiroli shared his doubts concerning the preservation of the EU's identity in the course of enlargement, not so much due to the present accessions but rather the prospective enlargement to Turkey and the Balkan countries. On the other hand, the process offers greater diversity and flexibility inside the EU.

Regarding the outlook of the EU's evolution, Mr Missiroli pointed to another paradox: the EU calls on candidate countries to reform as a precondition and a goal of accession. Mr Missiroli asked whether those countries, which are the source of certain threats (including Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Morocco and Algeria, as well as Turkey with its Kurd issue) could indeed be stabilised without clear prospects of membership.

Mr Missiroli also discussed the directions of potential EU enlargement: while the conference was focused on Eastern Europe, there was the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership to consider, the accession of Malta and Cyprus, and the increasing dialogue with the Maghreb and the Middle East as well as the Sub-Saharan Africa. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership is both an area of hope and of concerns; it may also be the locus of traditional and modern threats.

The future of the European Union will depend on the capacity of the Member States to juggle all the dimensions in order to play a non-zero-sum game.

### **Aleksander Smolar**

Mr Smolar said that Mr Missiroli brought to relief the complexity of internal architecture of the European Union, which is decisive to its unique "neo-imperialism". It is important to find a formula to export stability without formal enlargement.

Mr Smolar also said that the new model of the EU which the previous speaker thought was a far prospect is indeed developing right now; integration at different speeds discussed by EU analysts may take shape really soon.

## Heather Grabbe

Research Director, Centre for European Reform, London

Ms Grabbe mainly discussed the challenges faced by the drafters of the EU's eastern policy. After September 11, 2001 such as terms as "threat" and "security" have had to be redefined. Threats now include new phenomena, such as trafficking in people, mass migrations, or transnational terrorist organisations which cannot be dismantled with traditional defences. Moreover, the threats have decentralised: they are posed not only by states or organisations, but also by individuals. Hence, the growing importance of borders to security. Meanwhile, the European political class aims to dismantle borders as barriers; yet the majority of the European public see borders as walls protecting them from danger.

States cannot guarantee their citizens security with military means.

Ms Grabbe said that this perception of borders is not unique to West Europeans: sociological research in Poland suggests that the future EU Member States are also prone to build barriers around them. This is a particular European paradox.

Another paradox stems from the Schengen formula: while it enables free movement of people in the EU, it clearly differentiates between people legally residing in the EU and "aliens." Is it possible to soften the Schengen formula? Unfortunately, rigorous formulas are facts. This dilemma will have to be faced by new EU Member States as soon as they are fully bound by the Schengen *acquis*.

Migrations are increasingly perceived as a threat to security rather than an opportunity of economic growth.

Ms Grabbe strongly criticised the political class of the EU for their focus on border controls rather than integration, especially in regions to be covered by the EU's eastern policy. This is mainly a consequence of the EU politicians' unwillingness to incur financial costs and to develop formulas for integration. Enlargement of the free trade area, for instance to Moldova or Morocco, requires a revision of the EU's economic policy, which Ms Grabbe believes is strongly protectionist, at least in agriculture; yet that calls for both courage and vision.

Ms Grabbe put forth recommendations for EU officials: for instance, isolationism which is the root cause of EU Member States' rigorous application of the Schengen *acquis* could be softened by issuing Schengen visas valid in all EU Member States. Such visas could be issued by EU consulates to be

established in neighbouring countries; the consulates would also be responsible for assistance and information programmes. “The people of Western Ukraine would have more exposure to the EU than just by the fact of queuing for a visa,” said Ms Grabbe.

Finally, Ms Grabbe discussed the concessions and the flexibility of the EU in the area of the Common Security and Defence Policy. Can a compromise be reached on such issues? How can the EU take responsibility for failed states? Ms Grabbe welcomed the results of recent interventions (especially the EU’s presence in the Balkans) but called for hard-ly realistic albeit much more effective pre-emptive actions. Yet, such humanitarian interventions and long-time presence in “humanitarian protectorates” would require determination which the EU’s politicians and general public lack. However, humanitarian protectorates are the only reasonable alternative to the stability-driven EU enlargement *ad infinitum*.



The EU won’t be willing to enlarge indefinitely; yet how many protectorates will it want to have, and for how long?

## Bronisław Komorowski

former Minister of Defence of Poland, Warsaw

Mr Komorowski discussed the impact of enlargement on the external security of the entire EU, and pointed to different experiences of the border states of the EU due to their history and present location.

Speaking of double loyalties – to NATO and the EU, Mr Komorowski described a door with two locks: the NATO lock gives so much hard security that similar EU structures would not be necessary. It is much more important for Brussels to develop a common foreign policy open to new experiences and threats. Such a policy is a necessary condition for a real sense of security among the new EU Member States, especially its border states. Po-

Borders are becoming tighter as we speak, what’s more, they are turning into real barriers.

land and other candidate countries would welcome a common defence policy even before formal accession. Further discussions, especially in view of the rift between the policies of the EU and the USA, place an uncomfortable dilemma ahead of the candidate countries.

Mr Komorowski argued with previous interventions as he pointed to the importance of hard military means of security. A civilian crisis (like September 11) can easily turn into a military one (US interventions in Central Asia and the Middle East).

Mr Komorowski criticised the EU politicians' lack of consistency in their "philosophy of borders": declarations of increased integration are coupled with new barriers to the movement of people; what previous speakers called a paradox, Mr Komorowski said was hypocrisy. Its implications hit the candidate countries: tighter borders may hinder the process of overcoming mental barriers and negative stereotypes through personal contacts; due to their historical experience, this is particularly important to Central European countries.

Mr Komorowski emphasised the close correlation between democratisation of a country and its long-term political stability. This correlation, witnessed also in the neighbouring countries, justifies the "limited sense of security" of Polish politicians. Lack of civilian control of the military or the presence of offensive armies in some neighbouring countries inspire Poland's strong interest in a common defence policy of the European Union, a coherent and consistent policy that would rely on NATO's military capacity which offers guarantees of security.



## Dominique Moïsi

Deputy Director, French Institute of International Relations (IFRI), Paris



Mr Moïsi argued against the imperial metaphor evoked by other speakers: EU structures and the logic of EU expansion are nowhere like the Roman Empire – the comparison would be more apt in the case of the USA.

Mr Moïsi was far from an enthusiastic appreciation of the EU elites. He criticised French politicians who are unwilling to discuss the Eastern Dimension. Many in the Brussels elite are leaning towards neo-isolationism, building Fortress Europe.

According to Mr Moïsi, the main reason for this confusion is the lack of conclusions in the debate on the European identity opened several years ago. As Europe has no definition, EU members are discouraged to discuss the eastern policy. The main dilemma, whether Europe is a geographical or a political notion, remains open. Hence the lack of EU position on potential future membership of Russia.

Mr Moïsi criticised the recent trend among EU Member States to found a counterweight for the USA within the European Union; the political construct is to rely on the reconstituted Paris-Berlin-Moscow triangle. This seems to attest to both nostalgia and lack of realism. The alternative solution is to strengthen and promote European identity. This position was proved correct by the success of the EU stability mission in the Balkans; yet, the policy can only be effective if “old Europe” gives up on the defensive and on short-sighted anti-Americanism. Both the defensive position and the lack of conclusions from the identity debate may push the candidate countries to strong pro-American involvement with prejudice to the identity of the new Europe.

[We, the EU Member States] want to be a kind of big Switzerland: rich, selfish, and in fact unimportant, whose selfishness protects it from the wind of history.

You are forcing us to say which is more important: the value of geography or the geography of values.

## Andrey Zagorsky

Deputy Director, Institute for Applied International Research (IAIR), Moscow

I think I will live to see not so much Russia in the European Union as a situation where this issue will matter no more.

Visa requirements for Russians, Ukrainians and nationals of other countries had an adverse effect ... but they also helped to curtail mafia activity.

We [in Russia] do not have to accept the entire package of requirements imposed by the Schengen *acquis* but we must ensure tight controls on our borders.

Mr Zagorsky stressed the need for new visions and goals now that the pro-EU efforts of the democratic elites of Central European countries are being crowned with success. The main tasks ahead include the redefinition of the EU's common defence policy in view of new challenges. The proposed goal to "make the EU borders flexible" is particularly difficult to achieve with the onset of new threats: organised crime, migrations, and hard terrorism.

Another issue discussed by Mr Zagorsky was that of relations between Russia and the European Union. Russia may join the EU structures (or the borders between Russia and the EU may diminish) only if a regime is put in place whereby Russian nationals could freely cross the Schengen borders.

Mr Zagorsky called for visa-free movement of people between the European Union and those neighbouring countries, which meet specific criteria. These include effective prevention of organised crime and regulated borders of Russia (especially southern and eastern borders) or the adoption of a quasi-Schengen regime of semi-borders or even lack of clearly demarcated borders in lieu of today's free movement of people. The presence of large Russian minorities in neighbouring countries and a need for another identity debate – on the identity of Russia, the CIS, and the post-Soviet countries – remain open issues.



Mr Zagorsky stressed the priority: to clearly define the area subject to the EU's eastern policy and possible liberalisation of cross-border movement of people: the "east" of Europe should include Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. Otherwise, the Schengen regime will be put in place along the borders of Russia with these countries, involving huge financial and political costs.

Mr Zagorsky criticised the slow progress of work on a "broader European vision"; both Brus-



sels and Moscow at present tend to take an *ad hoc* defensive position on issues of the EU's eastern policy. The alternative is to create a common pan-European economic area and to find an open-minded solution to the issue of visas for non-EU nationals.

## DISCUSSION

### Artur Hajnicz

*Poland in Europe Foundation, Warsaw*

Mr Hajnicz followed up on the issue of confusion among new EU members considering the usefulness of NATO, US, and EU guarantees of security. He quoted opinion polls, which suggest a clear turn of the Polish general public towards the EU. The anti-war sentiment of Poles will help them identify with the EU defence policy. Mr Hajnicz questioned the alleged pro-US orientation of Poles; even politicians traditionally allied with Washington are likely to change their position.

### Vaclav Zak

*Editor, "Britske Listy", Prague*

Mr Zak questioned the division between "old Europe" and "new Europe" made in the months preceding the Iraq intervention. A variety of behaviours including wide scepticism about the governmental policy on the Middle East issue point to a common European identity, be it doubted by the "old Europe."

### Krzysztof Bobiński

*Editor, "Union & Poland" Magazine, Warsaw*

Mr Bobiński offered his definition of the EU identity: the EU is not so much a union or federation of states as a set of procedures for the resolution of conflicts between countries and nations without violence. This formula may become a fundamental criterion in the accession of new EU members.

## **Zdzisław Najder**

*Professor with Opole University, Warsaw-Opole*

Mr Najder referred to several interventions and pointed to the military dimension of contemporary anti-terrorist campaigns and their limited effect in eliminating the root cause of international crises. Quoting the “door with locks” metaphor coined by Mr Komorowski, Mr Najder stressed the limited validity and effect of NATO guarantees. This implies that the EU capacity should be used to prevent environmental disasters, demographic or political instability. Mr Najder emphasised the advantages of existing definitions of the European Common Foreign and Security Policy: the present and future EU members (including Poland) already benefit from it. This also helps the irreversible process of identity building. As a result, in the coming years Poland will be in a position to combine its two loyalties as an ally of the USA and an important part of stability in Central Europe.

## **Zdzisław Lachowski**

*Analyst, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Stockholm*

Mr Lachowski stressed the different position of “old Europe” and “new Europe” on issues of security: Eastern Europe tends to be more serious about military guarantees. Development of the EU’s eastern policy would benefit from the ratification of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty by all European countries. Mr Lachowski called for a redefinition of the Northern Dimension in view of the fact that the Baltic will become the EU’s internal sea and given the need to regulate the status of the Kaliningrad enclave (also in military terms).

## **Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski**

*Łódź University, Łódź*

Despite many preceding sceptical comments, Mr Żurawski vel Grajewski said that the European Common Foreign and Defence Policy is a fact; the only question is what position the EU should take on specific issues. He said that the EU’s eastern policy will not (and will not need to) cover military issues. Both the Polish non-paper and further proposals to expand it include peace-

ful instruments of international policy. Mr Żurawski vel Grajewski questioned the EU's capacity to make humanitarian interventions in the ex-USSR, even in order to help failed states, such as Moldova. The EU has never defined itself as a military alliance; it would be a misunderstanding to expect Brussels to make far-reaching concessions. The EU's extensive capacity to pursue an eastern policy should not be combined with its limited military capacity.

### **Włodzimierz Mokry**

*Jagiellonian University, Cracow*

Professor Mokry emphasised the need to expand the understanding of the new EU neighbours, an issue related to the opening up of borders. He shared his concern about the ignorance of most students on Polish-Ukrainian or Polish-Lithuanian relations, which is staggering if unreciprocated. Professor Mokry also called to initiate and co-ordinate educational projects to promote information about the neighbours of Poland. This is indispensable as on-going European integration will give rise to reactions defending national identity; historical ignorance may foster xenophobia.

### **Jakub Boratyński**

*Director of the International Co-operation Programme,  
Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw*

Mr Boratyński said that the need to develop an eastern policy, especially in view of the crisis caused by the Iraq conflict in Europe, offers an opportunity to make joint efforts among present and new EU members. Yet Mr Boratyński was far from optimistic. It is paradoxical that such countries as Ukraine have fallen victim to their own success. As their politicians managed to avert serious crises or conflicts, frequently suffered at times of transition, they dropped off the EU agenda altogether.

Mr Boratyński also pointed to the implications of the commitment of the new EU members, including Poland, to protect the EU borders. Apart from the Schengen *acquis*, there is a space where the Polish government could pursue a policy of openness and integration of the neighbouring nations.

Examples include the proposal to grant free-of-charge visas to Ukrainian nationals or to enable “small border traffic” for citizens of non-EU neighbouring countries. Such solutions are important for at least two reasons: they help Poland (and the Schengen system) to win trust and they work as a test of the autonomy and effectiveness of the Polish diplomacy now in the EU.

### **Andrey Zagorsky**

Mr Zagorsky was the first speaker to address questions. He first defined the position of Russia in view of NATO’s internal conflict caused by the Iraq crisis. Russia’s foreign policy should strive to keep good relations with the USA and to maintain the prime role of the UN Security Council in important decision-making.

Mr Zagorsky seconded those speakers who were sceptical about fast development of the EU’s common defence policy: tokenism and loyalties to particular dimensions (Eastern Dimension, Mediterranean Dimension), though benefiting the EU in the long run, could in the short term delay the EU’s common position, also on the eastern policy which is the most important to Russia.

Mr Zagorsky also discussed specific challenges of the Common Defence Policy: the ratification of the CFE by the EU is not hindered by the often discussed issue of weapons in the possession of Georgia or Transdnierster but by Brussel’s expectations that Moscow will meet the requirements of the Treaty.

Mr Zagorsky agreed with those speakers who talked of “reciprocal ignorance” among the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. He said that his Institute has started a project to facilitate dialogue between Russia and the countries of the region.



## Dominique Moïsi

Mr Moïsi commented on President Jacques Chirac's statement on the position of the countries of "new Europe" on the Iraq crisis, criticised by several speakers. While far from praising the statement, Mr Moïsi admitted that it expressed the sentiment shared by many in France concerning the implications of EU enlargement; especially that the "Letter of the Eight" which provoked Mr Chirac's reaction was in breach of the EU's customary political practice.

Mr Moïsi stressed that despite temporary differences in the positions of EU members on the Iraq intervention, all Europeans share experiences that make them unwilling to resort to military solutions; in the long run, this offers a way to reach an agreement or foster a European sensitivity. Mr Moïsi warned that the sensitivity may prove flawed due to escapism.

Mr Moïsi also warned against self-complacency with the formula that Europe stands for a set of rules to effectively resolve international conflicts. We must urgently recall the axiological fundamentals of what Europe means; otherwise, seemingly effective means to resolve conflicts may become futile.

## Bronisław Komorowski

Mr Komorowski argued with the previous speaker: he said that the German-French-Belgian initiative prior to the "Letter of the Eight" could be considered an act against the spirit of European co-operation. Such behaviour may be caused by fear of change and by the diminishing importance of European powers. Mr Komorowski warned against projecting such fears onto the debate about the EU's foreign policy.

Mr Komorowski discussed developments in German politics and new solutions proposed by the opposition party of Christian Democrats. It is in Poland's interests to highlight needs and interests shared with Germany, Poland's closest neighbour.

Mr Komorowski's main comments concerned the "international security formulas" offered to new NATO and EU members by the USA and the EU. Mr Komorowski stressed the difference between the two: NATO is a safeguard against military threats while the EU gives protection against civilian crises.

However, civilian crises can easily turn into military ones. The EU security system is geared to protect markets rather than States. The difference between these two formulas may cause serious problems.

Mr Komorowski pointed to the absolute superiority of the NATO security system in terms of military capacity. Hence, the pro-American orientation of the new EU members is an important political fact.

### **Heather Grabbe**

Ms Grabbe addressed the division between “old” and “new” Europe. In her opinion, this does not imply a crisis in the EU; moreover, the EU is not likely to grow its own “eastern bloc”: even now in a vast majority of issues voted at the UN, the EU members take a common position as fundamental to unity.

Ms Grabbe pointed to the risk to the Community if politicians concerned with the position of the “new Europe” try to block enlargement. However, only an enlargement referendum in the Benelux or in France could halt the process; this seems very unlikely.

Ms Grabbe was sceptical about NATO’s success; as NATO remains largely a cold war institution, it carries the historical burden that stops it from evolving. NATO is not fit to fight terrorism. Hence, EU structures need to shoulder a new responsibility, unforeseeable several years ago: they have to develop means to prevent terrorism, which has a strong (and often adverse) impact on the EU’s eastern policy.

Ms Grabbe said that the rapprochement between Poland and Ukraine over the past decade was a great success. The model of reconciliation that proved successful on the Rhein could be adopted along the Bug.

Ms Grabbe was less optimistic about the model of EU enlargement: EU members are still afraid of enlargement and have not worked out an attractive alternative to accession. As a result, candidate countries risk complete rejection, which may cause strong negative sentiments.

Ms Grabbe quoted the formula of confederation proposed by François Mitterand in the early 1990s: a model of close relations with countries half-way to accession may become France’s important contribution to the EU’s foreign policy.

## Antonio Missiroli

Mr Missiroli said that the paradox of “tightening and opening” tackled by the speakers in the session could only be resolved by promoting cross-border trade while keeping up the requirements of security policy. The solution for countries in economic transition is not to adopt the *acquis* but to find a springboard in European markets. Future relations between Romania and Moldova may be an opportunity to test this formula.

Mr Missiroli discussed the neoimperial model as a formula of stability. Two important positive aspects of the model, guarantees of security and development of infrastructure, are too strongly divided in today’s world between the USA and the EU. The “American legions,” to use an analogy, ensure military security while the EU is expected to promote new legal and economic solutions, especially in areas of instability, such as the West Balkans. This strong division of responsibilities is not conducive to stabilisation, although both the USA and the EU proved effective when they had to step in to run the post-Yugoslavian legacy.

Mr Missiroli spoke against simplification abundant in both media reports and serious political debates. Despite the opposition of Germans against the Iraq intervention, Berlin’s logistic support for Washington’s operation was worth more than the declarations of pro-American EU members.

## Aleksander Smolar

Mr Smolar summarised the session. The notion of borders turned out to imply many different meanings. The debate proved that borders were more than technical or social notions: they also construct a relationship of power and pose a challenge to politicians and linguists.

Mr Smolar said that despite the drive to integration, new borders are being drawn. While EU’s external borders are made tighter, new borders appear inside the EU: regardless of similar positions on military intervention, the division into “old” and “new” Europe may become a fact, additionally fuelled by efforts to preserve own identity.

## **Presentation of the Centre for Eastern Studies Jacek Cichocki**

*Deputy Director, Centre for Eastern Studies, Warsaw*

After closing the third session, Mr Cichocki outlined the history and the activity of the Centre for Eastern Studies. Established by decision of Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki in 1990, this oldest think-tank in post-communist Poland is focused on widely understood eastern policy. Its current three major research programmes cover the EU's eastern policy, NATO's relations with the countries of the ex-USSR, and Islam in post-USSR regions.

Mr Cichocki was optimistic about the prospects of the EU's eastern policy. Despite the problems brought about by the Iraq crisis, the European partners have demonstrated the will to develop the EU's foreign policy. Exchange of opinions provoked by the "Letter of the Eight" helped to clear the ground and to clarify mutual expectations. Once again, a direct expression of emotions had positive results; the track record of previous internal crises overcome by the EU suggests that they are a means of reaching a compromise.