Annex A.   Belarus' informational sphere: The matrix of control

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                                    ┌─────────────┐
                                    │  President  │
                                    └──────┬──────┘
        ┌──────────────────┬───────────────┼──────────────────┐
        ▼                  ▼               ▼                  ▼
┌───────────────┐  ┌───────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────┐
│  Presidential │  │  Parliament   │ │   Security   │ │   GCBI   │
│Administration │  │(National      │ │   Council    │ │          │
│               │  │ Assembly)     │ │              │ │          │
└───────────────┘  └───────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────┘
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

On paper, Belarus' legal and administrative framework appears democratic. In practice, however, all state bodies and agencies function to service the control of the Presidential Administration.

The above diagram illustrates the stringent top-down nature of control and decision-making in Belarus as it relates to the informational environment, a pattern which is replicated in all other spheres in Belarus. ONI researchers on the ground have pieced together the different components of this "matrix of control" and suggest it has three basic components: political/security, legislative/administrative, and economic. Together this troika works to diversify pressure points on both government administrators and ordinary citizens, to ensure compliance with regime interests while maintaining the illusion of legality:

Political Power and the Secret Police

All key decisions, in all spheres, are made by the President, either in the form of official Decrees or "unofficial" (oral) statements. Statements get passed down the "vertical" levels for elaboration, legitimization and implementation. The legitimization process "from below" – whereby the President's statements are turned into draft legislation, policies or programmes -- is important for maintaining a veneer of regime "legitimacy" and the illusion of democratic functioning. However, the Presidential

Administration (PA) must approve all government decisions, including legislative matters, before they are submitted to the National Assembly. The PA also often intervenes in the activities of ministries and departments by issuing direct instructions.

Presidential power, including control over critical opponents and information, is further buttressed by the KGB and other special security bodies (State Center for Information Security, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Public Prosecutor) who have special investigative functions (invigilation of citizens including monitoring of communications) to "safeguard security" through covert, extralegal, intervention.

KGB

The KGB has a special technical department that investigates crimes related to communications technologies and allegedly engages in covert Computer Network Operations. The Belarus' opposition claims that the KGB has hacked and eliminated opposition web sites (using DoS attacks), but there are no documented evidence of such actions. The KGB has also investigated ICT related crimes, participated in a crackdown against "underground" mobile communication operators, and IP telephony-based office centers, and investigated a case of "on-line Hooliganism," allegedly perpetrated by the Belarus People's Liberation Army (which is thought to be a non-existent organization).

State Center for Information Security (GCBI)

The State Center for Information Security (GCBI) used to be part of the KGB but is now directly controlled by the President. The GCBI is roughly equivalent to the US National Security Agency although its focus is domestic rather than international. Among other things, it controls the top level Internet domain (.by), and is therefore in a position to fiddle with the second level DNS records of any website registered in the .by domain, to render them inaccessible. As noted in the main text, the opposition accused the GCBI of such tampering during the 2001 Presidential elections when some of their websites went down. It has also been accused of installing filters at the Beltelecom central Internet exchange.

Ministry of the Interior

Another security-enforcement body -- Department K under the Ministry of Internal Affairs – has demonstrated its prowess at intercepting and analyzing Internet traffic, which it has done to successfully fight cybercrime. As the main text of this report notes, the Minister of the Interior has signaled his intent to go after all those who "discredit the state of Belarus" on the Internet (See Part 3 of main text).

Legal and Administrative Control

As noted in the main text, the regime is characterized by a hyper-legalism wherein all actions require a legal pretext and strict regulations govern all forms of activity, most notoriously those dealing with financial regulations. However, it is the President's office that determines where, when and which laws are to be enforced, and illegalities are to be prosecuted. The legislative and administrative bodies (e.g., the National Assembly,[64] Security Council,[65] Council of Ministers,[66] Central Election Commission, Ministries, and Commissions) function to sanction Presidential decisions – either by "proposing"

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64 The National Assembly (NA) is controlled by the President, and as of the October 2004 elections, contains no members of the formal or informal political opposition. The NA automatically adopts laws introduced by the Ministries or the PA.

65 The Security Council elaborates the national security policy. The head of the SC is President Lukashenka.

66 Another rubber-stamp institution. The Council of Minister (CM) only approves programs that are proposed or agreed to by the President and the PA.

legislation (based on "suggestions" from the PA) or rubber stamping pre-approved legislation. The subsequent enforcement of legislation is then distributed among relevant ministries according to jurisdiction, but subject to Presidential directives. With respect to the Internet, several administrative bodies "shape" and discipline the ISP sector:

Ministry of Communication and Informatization (MCI).

MCI has a regulatory (licensing, certification, inspection) function over telecommunications services, but is also the dominant telecommunications operator given its ownership of Beltelecom (the state run telecommunications monopoly). As a matter of course, the MCI makes policy based on serving the interests of Beltelecom. For example, Beltelecom enjoys a legally enforced monopoly over all international communication services including the Internet, as all commercial ISPs must rent external channels from it. Beyond this, everything from the use of wireless equipment through to the operation of a Local Area Network (LAN) and videoconferencing requires state permissions and permits.[67] Only Beltelecom is permitted to provide IP Telephony, which it does at high rates for considerable profit.[68] The Beltelecom monopoly serves other important political and financial functions for the regime. For example, its high charges for international calls and ISP leasing of lines yield substantial profits that are used to subsidize the costs for local calls, which expands its monopoly – defacto – over local telecommunications provision as well (as competitors cannot compete). Profits are also used to subsidize the otherwise unsustainable industries, providing livelihoods for the mass of workers who are Lukashenka's main powerbase.

Anyone that uses communications technologies without the required permit – or for "inappropriate" communications -- can be charged with "illegal" activities under the criminal code. The Ministry of Communications has been known to refuse licenses for LANs in apartment buildings. Indeed, in February 2006, the Ministry announced its intention to "liquidate" unregistered domestic computer networks, which are thought to number around 1,300 in Belarus, and provide affordable Internet access to some 45,000 users. Experts commented that the move was motivated by the need to remove threats to Beltelcom's monopoly as well as to de facto cut Internet access for several thousand people.[69]

Finally, because most Internet traffic in Belarus flows through Beltelecom's "hands," it enjoys a significant capacity to monitor or filter Internet traffic, should this be of interest (see discussion in Part 1).

State Inspectorate of Telecommunication (BelGIE)

The State Inspectorate of Telecommunication (BelGIE), acts as the MCI's main oversight body with significant powers to supervise the activity of telecommunication operators (including ISPs) in the areas of network licensing, functioning and facilities, and is empowered to impose fines and initiate license withdrawal (see main text, Part 3).

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67 Activities liable to licensing are listed in Presidential Decree 1387 "On licensing of separate kinds of activity" (14.07.2003).

68 See also Box 2 in main text.

69 PAP (Polska Agencja Prasowa), 20.2.2006 and Bybanner.com, AFN news agency, Belarusy i Rynok, 20.2.2006. An ADSL connection can range from $95 – $385 per month plus $28 – $70 for every two hours of on-line time. The average monthly salary in Belarus is about 385 USD. Networks that encompass several apartments or the entire building allow for sharing of Internet costs.

Ministry of Information

The Ministry of Information does not yet have formal responsibility for the ICT sphere, however representatives of the Ministry have repeatedly declared the need to filter access to inappropriate Internet resources. The Ministry has elaborated a new draft law "On Media" that seeks to classify the Internet as a "mass media outlet" in order to bring it under the same controls that govern the press, radio and television in Belarus. This could mean measures stemming from the required registration of websites – both domestic and foreign -- through to control over content.

> **Box 5. Legal control over Internet content**
>
> As detailed in Part 3 of the main text, direct political control of the Internet in terms of what websites and content are allowed to be accessed inside Belarus is still in its infancy. Criminal code legislation prohibiting slandering of the President has already been used to charge Internet offenders, and the December 2005 changes to the criminal code (prohibiting discrediting of the state) will also apply to information carried on the Net. Beyond this, pending legislation "On the Media" promises to define the Internet as a "mass media outlet" subjecting to the same highly restrictive set of laws that have effectively stifled the independent "traditional" media in Belarus (e.g., registration of all websites "broadcasting" inside Belarus, content regulations etc).

National Academy of Sciences and BasNet

One other body with independent access to the Internet is the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus whose computer network – BasNet -- has a license for autonomous satellite access. The "independence" of this channel, however, is tempered by the Academy's direct supervision by the Presidential Administration.

Economic and Financial Control

In the early days of Lukashenka's regime, his fight against corruption and the still-entrenched *nomenklatura*, helped to consolidate Presidential control over all aspects of the economy. The formal financial regulative bodies (National Bank, State Customs Committee, Tax Ministry, State Control Committee) have extensive powers to supervise all economic activity and financial transactions in the country. These powers are often used to harass independent entities – from civic groups and organizations, through to newspapers and other information producers -- to pressure them to conform to state directives and ideology. Economic control has yielded numerous critical financial and political benefits for the regime, including:

1) **A proliferation of lucrative state monopolies**, particularly in the telecommunications banking, and gas sectors. The generous income from these enterprises allows the state to "re-invest" in more political goals, such as maintaining non-viable collective farms and industries, which provide stable employment for key constituents.[70] As noted above, the Beltelecom monopoly has additional benefits in terms of controlling Belarus' informational environment.

A maintenance of the balance of power within state structures. Charges of mismanagement, corruption and embezzlement against heads of companies and industries are used to ensure obedience to the President. Frequently, individuals who have built-up some authority within regime structures are accused of corruption, and thereby removed.[71]

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70 Heritage Foundation, 2005, *Index of Economic Freedom*. The monopolies also close out opportunities for the rise of an independent middle (business) class, which in turn increases the population's financial dependence on state structures.

71 For example, in 2003, the regime arrested some 150 directors of state enterprises and launched 440 lawsuits for large-scale theft and embezzlement against 1,638 individuals. See: The Observatory for the Protection of Human Rights Defenders, 2004. Belarus: The "liquidation" of the independent civil society, No. 388 (April).

2) **The obedience of Small and Medium Businesses,** which are subject to a host of administrative regulations that compel support for the regime. Personal economic pressures in the form of petty fines and taxation, which can be frequently made to disappear with a small donation to the right official, effectively stifle small and medium enterprise – including, independent media. Short suspensions of newspapers are frequently a death sentence as they lose crucial advertising revenue.

3) **The enlistment of big (international business) in the service of state interests**, as financial levers are used to compel independent entities to conform to state interests.

4) **Control over civic groups and organizations**. In addition to cutting NGOs off from external financial resources the state uses the pretext of 'economic crimes', ranging from tax evasion to irregularities in tax declarations, to pressure NGOs and individual civil actors. These carry substantial penalties, including fines and prison terms.

When it comes to the Internet in particular, financial control of ISPs and telecommunication operators are achieved mostly by way of items number 1, 3, and 5 above, and generally consisting of fine-grained control over all financial operations. The State Control Committee (KGK) is directly responsible for inspecting the economic activities of communication operators. Significantly the KGK is controlled by the Security Council.

Annex B. ONI methodology and test results June 2005--January 2006

General Methods

ONI performs technical testing across multiple levels of access at multiple time intervals. The team analyzes results within the contextual framework of the target state's filtering technology and regulations. To obtain meaningful, accurate results we:

- generate lists of domain names and URLs that have been or are likely to be blocked;
- enumerate ISPs and national routing topography;
- determine the type, location, and behavior of the filtering technology;
- deploy network interrogation and enumeration software at multiple access points; and
- conduct a thorough statistical analysis of results.

Determining which URLs to test is a vital component of ONI research, as it reveals the filtering system's technical capacity and content areas subject to blocking. ONI employs two types of lists:

1. "**High impact" sites**, reported to be blocked or likely to be blocked in the state of concern due to their content (for example, political opposition); and

2. **A "global list,"** containing a control list of manually categorized Web sites reflecting a range of Internet content (for example, news and hacking sites).

To explore Internet filtering, ONI deploys network interrogation devices and applications, which perform the censorship enumeration, at various Internet access levels. These tools download the ONI testing lists and check whether specific URLs and domains are accessible from that point on the network. Interrogation devices are designed to run inside a state (i.e., behind its firewall) to perform specific, sensitive functions with varying degrees of stealth. Similarly, ONI distributes interrogation applications to trusted volunteers who run the software inside the state. For testing, ONI obtains network access at multiple levels through:

- Proxy servers
- Long distance dial-up
- Distributed applications
- Dedicated servers

During initial testing, ONI uses remote computers located in countries that filter. These remote computers are located behind the state's firewalls yet allow access to clients connecting from the wider Internet. ONI attempts to access the URL and domain name lists through these computers to reveal what content is filtered, and how consistently it is blocked. ONI also tests these lists from control locations in non-filtered states. The testing system flags all URLs and domains that are accessible from the control location, but inaccessible from ones inside the target state, as potentially blocked.

General Results Analysis

The standard ONI testing methodology yields results along a graduated scale based upon the HTTP header returns obtained during the testing period.

We classify our results into one of four categories that range from the absence of any filtering through to the unambiguous presence of filtering indicated by a "block page" generated by the filtering software (see ONI Test Result Typology, below). A fifth special category of "dead sites" can either be indicative of sites that are "dead" because they no longer exist or of sites that are not responding because they are under a sustained DoS attack.

 In between the clear absence or presence of filtering, are several gradients of returns which require further investigation, but which can also provide conclusive evidence of filtering. In some of these cases, filtering is accomplished though blocking IP addresses on backbone routers; in others, by introducing long "time outs" on requests to specific IP addresses. In both cases, ONI's follow-up methods generally allow us to generate enough evidence to confirm whether "filtering" is taking place. This ONI methodology is robust and proven for detecting the presence of filtering as well as the specific content that is being blocked.

ONI Test Result Typology

- **Not filtered** - URL is accessible from the control location and the in-country testing location.

- **Possible Filtering** - URL is accessible from the control location but inaccessible from the in-country testing location due to a network connection error. This result is inconclusive. The inability to access a URL could be a consequence of network failure, error or failure of ISP name servers, or blocking of IP addresses (for example). Without additional testing the cause of the loss of access cannot be determined with any certainty.

- **Probable Filtering** - URL is accessible from the control location but inaccessible from the in-country testing location, which returned a different HTTP response code. Filtering can usually be identified by http header returns.   For example, some filtering systems return a "403 Forbidden" error.

- **Filtered** - URL is accessible from the control location but inaccessible from the in-country testing location and the in-country testing connection returns a block page.

- **"Dead"**- URL is inaccessible through both the local connection and the remote computer. In most cases the URL can be "extinct". However, this can also be indicative of a site which has been taken down" by a "Denial of Service" (DoS) attack.

However, in situations where blocking occurs in a dynamic, high demand environment – such as elections -- elevated user expectations and large traffic volumes can often cause network congestion and failure that renders leads sites "inaccessible". In these cases the effectiveness of the ONI testing protocol declines as error messages are often inconsistent and each case must be investigated to rule out the possibility of either network congestion or other transmission faults (rather than filtering).

Methods Specific to Belarus

To analyze Belarus' Internet filtering system, ONI initially tested three ISPs in Belarus to determine blocking patterns and identify any differences in filtering between providers. We conducted tests between June 2005 and January 2006 from within Belarus on the networks of the ISPs AtlantTelecom, Belinfonet, and Beltelecom. The tests included our global list and a high impact list of sites specific to Belarus.

Results and Analysis for Initial Belarus Testing (June 2005-January 2006)

Summary

In total, ONI tested 624 URLs on each ISP. Results showed minimal filtering; less than 1% of sites tested were inaccessible from the ISPs AtlantTelecom (1 URL), and Beltelecom (2 URLs). None of the sites tested were inaccessible from Belinfonet. The inaccessible sites were Russian gay pornographic sites.

Topics Tested

ONI tested the standardized global list, which contains high-profile Web sites in 31 categories, as well as a list of "high impact" sites selected specifically for testing in Belarus. The high impact list contained sites known or likely to be blocked, or sites that were alleged to have been blocked in Belarus for hosting sensitive content.

Filtering Methods

ONI testing indicated that the blocked sites were being filtered by way of IP address blocking. ISPs were preventing access to the targeted sites (gay porn sites) by configuring their routers to reject requests for the site's IP address. This method blocks access to all web sites hosted on the targeted IP address.

Global List Results

ONI's testing in Belarus included our new global list comprised of 458 sites in 28 categories. All these sites were are accessible from all ISPs.

High-Impact List Results (sites specific for Belarus)

AtlantTelecom and Beltelecom blocked www.gayly.ru. Beltelecom also blocked www.gay.ru.

Annex C. "Inaccessible" websites from the Beltelecom network on 19 March 2006

ONI testing on 19 March 2006 found that 37 of the 197 websites tested were inaccessible when accessed from the Beltelecom network in Belarus but were accessible when connections were made at the same time from the external control location. In addition, all 37 affected websites were accessible from the Belinfonet network (inside Belarus).[72] The tables below offer a breakdown and description of the inaccessible sites, grouped by error type.

Table C.1. "Connection Refused" Errors

A connection refused error suggests a TCP/IP connectivity issue between the requesting computer and the remote server -- either the remote server or a computer on the path between it and the requester has actively refused the connection. This error is indicative of IP-based blocking.[73]

Type of Site	URL	Description of Site
Opposition political party	http://www.ucpb.info/	The official website of the United Civic Party, which offers alternative news, critical commentary of the Belarus regime and links to other opposition sites. The site also lists the Milinkevich supporters who have been detained for "petty hooliganism. The sections on party structure, documents, photo archive, forum and library have been inactive.
Opposition political party	http://www.bsdp.org/	The site of the Belarus Social Democratic Party, containing opposition leader Kozulin's political platform, a video of his address to the public and recent news including a joint statement of the opposition for continued protest against the result of the elections.
Independent media site	http://www.belmarket.by/	The online version of a newspaper, which is also available in paper format. It provides updated independent news on politics, international relations, and economics, among other topics.
Independent media	http://www.bdg.by/	The Belarus Business Gazette, which covers politics, international matters, culture, and economics among other topics. It had a separate section for election coverage. Its archive dates from 1997 and includes special reports such as monitoring of the 2001 elections, and the disappearance of high profile individuals in 2001. The site posted information on how to access news provided by BelaPAN in case the site was blocked during elections. The site has a link to the Fund for Support of the Free Press, which itself hosts a "who's who in Belarus" listing of pubic figures and their biographies
Media site (web portal)	http://www.svaboda2006.org/	A web news portal supporting links to other online news sources on politics and economics.
Opposition movement	http://www.studenty.alternativy.net/	A student site against Lukashenka's regime. It advertised the petition that was collecting signatures to protest the election result.
Independent media	http://www.svaboda.org/	The website of radio station Svaboda (Freedom), the Belarus service of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), transmitting both current and archived programmes. News is updated several times per hour.
Minority faiths	http://www.islam.by/	An Islamic religious site, with articles and analysis of the Koran etc.
	http://www.mfront.net/	Only the main page is active. I had problems accessing other sections with links provide on the main page (archive, history of the movement, etc.)
Gay	http://www.gay.ru/	Russian site of interest to the homosexual community.

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72 Belinfonet had a connection issue with only one site: http://www.belarusy.com/. This site was accessible from Beltelecom throughout the testing period.

73 However, it could also be that the webserver is down or has incorrect information in DNS. This would not be expected from IP blocking (null routing) which would result in a timeout.

Table C2. "Timeout when reading Body" Errors

"Timeout when reading body" errors indicate that although the connection to the site was successful, the content of the site was being transferred so slowly that the connection eventually timed out.

Type of Site	URL	Description of Site
Opposition unity	http://www.belngo.info/	Assembly of Belarus Pro-Democratic NGOs, offering comprehensive news on the results of election, acts of solidarity, links to opposition movements, etc.
Independent media	http://www.belintellectuals.com/	Intellectual society site, providing analysis on current issues, encouraging blogging, etc.
Independent movement	http://www.prizyv2005.alternativy.net/	Youth Initiative site, against the civil war and military resolution of political problems. (does not support Lukashenka)
Opposition political party	http://www.ucpb.org/	Official website of the United Civic Party (but on different IP address than in Table 1).
Opposition movement	http://www.zubr-belarus.com/	Youth movement "Zubr". Site provides information on missing politicians and arrested and sentenced activists, along with press releases, and also documents international actions of solidarity with Belarus. Users can print out "Zubr" logo, stickers, etc.
Independent media	http://www.naviny.by/	Belarus News, an Internet newspaper run by BelaPAN (a news gathering agency), which provides independent political news and commentary, as well as financial, cultural and sports coverage. News service is available by email (which circumvents blocking). In preparation for the election, the site provided several web addresses in case the primary one was blocked.
Independent movement	http://pahonia.promedia.by/ http://www.pahonia.promedia.by/	Online newspaper
Informative	http://www.livejournal.com/	Internet-diaries created and modified by the users.
Opposition movement	http://www.a-klimov.com/	Andrei Klimov's democratic movement, which is strongly anti-Lukashenka.
Informative	http://www.plyn.org/	Provides services to help users create and manage their own website (but most of the information is not legible).
Opposition party	http://www.bchd.info/	Belarus Christian Democrats' site, which is critical of both the regime and the opposition. The site incorporates news from other online news sources
Independent media	http://www.vybor.org/	Civil Initiative for free and fair elections.
Opposition movement	http://www.pbnf.org/	Belarus People's Front
Independent/ opposition monitoring site	http://www.wolnabialorus.org	Democratic association focused on promoting democracy in Belarus created by Polish youths, and including representatives of Belarus opposition.
Opposition political party	http://pkb.promedia.by/	The Communist Party
Opposition political party	http://www.kozylin.com/	The official website of Kozulin, the second most popular opposition candidate, providing biographic information, political platform, names of organizations/movements that support him, etc. His highly critical political address made during the elections on TV and radio stations is recorded and available online.

Table C3. "Socket Timeout" Errors

A "Socket Timeout" is the maximum amount of time the testing client will wait for a response from a remote server before terminating the connection. The "Socket Timeout" prevents the testing client from hanging indefinitely. This error is indicative of network problems, routing failures or IP blocking (null routing).

Type of Site	URL	Description of Site
Independent media	http://www.nn.by/	Media site, containing news, analysis. etc.
Independent Observation Mission	http://www.elections2006.az/	A domestic organization monitoring the elections. The participants present themselves as "independent" and concluded that the elections were not free and fair.
Opposition Initiative	http://www.multclub.org/	Website posting cartoons. Including of Lukashenka. Also contains forums and links to opposition sites.
Opposition	http://www.bielarus.net/	Site of Belarus Solidarity. denouncing Lukashenka's regime and his violation of the Election Laws.
Opposition movement	http://www.solidarliuf6.org/	An Initiative of Charter 97, which advocates for silent protest by lighting a candle every month.
Opposition	http://www.rubar.org/	Site motivating people to vote on the election day: openly denounces Lukashenka and his support form Russia. and includes an article on youth protests.
Opposition movement	http://www.3d-av.org/	Youth society site supporting the protesters against the election result. and offering election news. discussion, analysis. and information about solidarity expressed in other countries.
Discussion forum	http://www.bielarus.org/	Internet forum for expression of ideas. political views and other interests.
Discussion forum	http://www.yoka.tk/	Chat forum for "young" Belarus. who are inclined towards "civic activism"

Annex D. Additional websites reported as blocked, hacked or DoSed during the elections by the opposition media

This list contains descriptions of additional websites (beyond those listed in Annex C above) that the opposition media reported as being blocked, hacked or under DoS attack during the election period.

Website	Description
www.milinkevich.org	(illegible)
www.charter97.org	(illegible)
www.elections.belarus.com	(illegible)
www.afn.by	(illegible)
www.belaruspartisan.org	(illegible)
www.tut.by	(illegible)
www.newsakawita.by	(illegible)
www.unibel.by/	(illegible)
www.yo.ru	(illegible)
www.livejournal.com	(illegible)
www.leader.ru	A site that provides a list of proxy-servers that allows users to circumvent domain-based filtering (mentioned on all Belarus oppositional sites as the proxy list). There are different categories, including basic information about the site, whois checkup, web privacy, proxy and NAT software, filtering programs etc. The site is available in Russian and English.

Annex E. Inaccessible sites (19 March) by ISP (and location)

On 19 March, 37 unique sites were inaccessible from the state-owned Beltelecom network in Minsk. The sites were hosted on 25 separate ISP, spread across 6 countries.

Website	IP Address	ISP	Country
http://www.svaboda.org/	193.111.134.85	RFERL-NET	CZ
http://www.naviny.by/	195.137.160.82	TUTBY-NET	BY
http://www.unibel.by/	195.50.0.161	UNIBEL	BY
http://bhc.unibel.by/	195.50.0.161	UNIBEL	BY
http://www.livejournal.com/	204.9.177.18	SIXAPART	US
http://www.belmarket.by/	217.16.28.138	Masterhost	RU
http://www.nn.by/	217.16.28.138	Masterhost	RU
http://pahonia.promedia.by/	217.16.28.138	Masterhost	RU
http://www.pahonia.promedia.by/	217.16.28.138	Masterhost	RU
http://pkb.promedia.by/	217.16.28.138	Masterhost	RU
http://www.bdg.by/	217.23.147.147	CARAVAN-HOSTING	RU
http://www.svaboda2006.org/	217.31.49.3	IGNUM-CZ	CZ
http://www.voka.tk/	62.129.131.38	VERZA	NL
http://www.zubr-mogilev.tk/	62.129.131.38	VERZA	NL
http://www.gay.ru/	62.205.161.8	Corbina Telecom	RU
http://www.mfront.net/	63.241.136.205	CERFnet	US
http://www.a-klimov.com/	64.21.117.97	Net Access Corporation	US
http://www.bchd.info/	66.135.33.237	ServerBeach	US
http://www.islam.by/	66.235.186.165	HopOne Internet Corporation	US
http://www.wolnabialorus.org/	66.244.251.19	Big Pipe Inc.	CA
http://www.bielarus.net/	66.45.228.135	Interserver	US
http://www.vybar.org/	66.45.228.135	Interserver	US
http://www.bsdp.org/	66.98.250.75	Everyones Internet	US
http://www.belngo.info/	69.50.196.170	ATJEU	US
http://www.plyn.org/	69.50.196.170	ATJEU	US
http://www.solidarity16.org/	69.93.4.245	ThePlanet.com	US
http://www.zubr-belarus.com/	69.93.4.245	ThePlanet.com	US
http://www.studenty.alternativy.net/	70.84.17.228	ThePlanet.com	US
http:www.prizyv2005.alternativy.net/	70.84.17.228	ThePlanet.com	US
http://www.belintellectuals.com/	70.85.182.2	ThePlanet.com	US
http://www.vybor.org/	72.29.73.91	HostDime.com	US
http://www.pbnf.org/	72.9.232.242	Global Net Access	US
http://www.gsu.unibel.by/	80.94.161.9	BAS-NET	BY
http://www.elections2006.ws/	81.177.10.242	AGAVA	RU
http://www.ucpb.info/	81.177.16.130	NETHOUSE-MOSCOW	RU
http://www.ucpb.org/	81.177.16.130	NETHOUSE-MOSCOW	RU
http://www.multclub.org/	81.222.134.156	SpaceWeb	RU
http://www.3dway.org/	81.222.134.156	SpaceWeb	RU
http://www.kozylin.com/	81.222.134.156	SpaceWeb	RU
http://www.byelarus.org/	82.165.193.206	SCHLUND-SHARED	US