

СЬВЕТАЧ ХРЫСТОВАЕ НАВУКІ

ПЕРШЫ БЕЛАРУСКА-ЭВАНГЕЛЬСКІ ЧАСАПІС

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ГІМН ЛЮБОВІ

Калі я гавару мовамі галавезымі і анельскімі, а любові ня маю, дык я падобны да медзі з анілагае ці цымбалаў гудзягых.

І калі я маю дар прароства, і ведаю ўсе тайніцы і ўсякае веданьне, і калі я маю ўсю веру, каб мог і горы перастаўляць, але ня маю любові, дык я нішто.

І калі я раздам усю маю маю бедным, і аддам цела маё на спаленьне, а любові ня маю, дык няма мне ніякае карысьці.

Любоў церпіць доўга, далікатная яна; любоў не завідуе; любоў ня вывышаецца, не надзімаецца.

Ня выяўляецца няпрстойна, ня шукае свайго ўласнага, ня хуткая да гневу, ня думае пра дрэннае;

Ня радуецца з крыўды, але цешыцца з праўды;

Усё пакрывае, усяму верыць, усяго спадзяецца, усё зносіць.

Любоў ніколі ня гзэьне: а вось прароцтвы — і тыя сутыняцца, і мовы змоўкнуць, і веды зніжтожацца.

Бо мы ведаем гасцькава, і гасцькава прарогым.

Калі-ж надгйдзе дасканалае, тады тое, што гасцькавае, шгзэьне.

Калі я быў дзіцянем, дык падзіцягаму гаварыў, падзіцягаму разумеў, падзіцягаму разважаў: а калі стаўся дарослым галавекам, тады пакінуў дзіцягае.

Цяперака мы багым быццам праз цьмяное шкло, здагадваюгься; тады-ж абліггам да аблігга: цяперака я ведаю гасцькава; а тады пазнаю гэтаксама, як сам я пазнаю.

А цяперака грываюць вера, надзея, любоў — гэтыя тры; але найбольшая зь іх зьяўляецца любоў.

Зь Першага Пасланьня

Сьв. Апостала Паўлы да Карынціянаў

ЧАЛАВЕК І ЯГОНАЕ СУМЛЕНЬНЕ

Маскоўскі мітрапаліт Платон Леўшын будаваў сабе скіт у трох вярстах ад Троіцка-Сяргеевае Лаўры. У Платона працавала некалькі цесьлярскіх арцеляў. Аднойчы ў вадной зь іх здарыўся нячуваны праступак: У ваднага цесьлі ўкралі сакеру. Ня толькі ён астаўся бяз рук, але і ў арцелі адной сілай на цэлую сакеру стала меней.

Работнікі прабавалі проста гаварыць аб гэтым; думалі так і гэтак — нічога ня выходзіць.

Раптам аднаго зь іх ахінула думка:

— Пойдзем, сябры, да ўладкы: ён да кажнае нашае працы блізкі і да нас ласкавы, трэба дадумвацца, на ўсё ён кэмны. Папросім паказаць.

— Так і гэтак, уладка сьвяты: зблудзіў нехта адзін, а ўсім гінуць. Прыходзіцца арцель разьбіваць і разыходзіцца ўсім у сваю сторону па сваіх хатах. Зрабі нам ласку — пакажы злодзья: мы яго, паскуцтва, зараз з арцелі выкінем.

— Ды-ж я не чарадзей, згадаць ня ўмею.

— Згадай на чым ведаеш, як сам можаў: мы цябе нявольці ня сьмеем.

— Я магу толькі адною сьвятою малітваю.

— Для нас усяроўна: спадзяемся на тваё добрае. Памажы дзеля Бога.

— Прыходзьце ўжо ў келью. Ды каб усе былі тварам. Уся арцель да-

званьня.

Гэтак і зрабілі: усе прыйшлі дазваньня.

— Ці ўсе сабраліся? — спытаў Платон.

— Усе, — адказалі яму.

— Памолімся Госпаду, папросім Яго сьвятой міласьці. Станавецца, сябры, і слухайце мяне, і паўтарайце кажны сабе словы малітвы.

— Р-сь, вась гэтак, — сказаў уладка, — але ўсе ўстанавіліся шчыльна, плячо ў плячо, і выступіў толькі на крок стараста.

— Пачынаю! — і павярнуўся ў пярэдні кут да абразоў.

Пачаў мітрапаліт Платон чытаць малітву тым асабліва гучным і прыемным голасам, што глыбака западаў у душу і падабаўся ўсім.

Прачытаўшы малітву, ён хутка хацеў пераканацца: спытаў, не абяртаючыся тварам назад:

— Ці моліцеся вы, брацьця?

— Усе да аднаго молімся Богу радасна, — адказвалі яму стрыманымі, баязьлівымі і дрыжачымі галасамі кастрамскія прастакі.


— Усе вы моліцеся, — а ці моліцца злодзей?

— Малюся, — прагаварыў ён чуць чутно і паслухмяна.


С. Максімаў

(Пераклад з расейскае мовы)

Два браты --- дзьве мэты



Ігар Пятроўскі



Юры Пятроўскі

Пасьля дакананьня прадбачанага курсу на працягу трох гадоў на Сыракузкім Унівэрсытэце, Ігар пераходзіць у Тоўсэн Стэйт Каледж у Балтімор, Мэрыленд.

Тут перад ім выступаюць дзьве задачы:

— Праца ў ролі выкладчыка эўрапейскае гісторыі і заходняе цывілізацыі з адданьнем каля 75 % ягонага часу. Будзе гэта добрая нагода выпрабаваньня і пашырэння атрыманае навукі і набыцця патрэбнае практыкі.

— Другая задача, якая мае забраць рэшту часу — гэта далейшыя студыі з мэтай здабыцця дактарату.

Калі гэтыя радкі выходзяць выдрукаванымі з-пад прэсу, Ігар адбывае

двухмесячнае падарожжа па Заходняй Эўропе, маючы на ўвазе мэты чыста навуковыя. З часу прыпадаючага на гэтае падарожжа, адзін месяц мае быць вызначаны на Галяндыю, у сталіцы якой, Амстэрдаме, Ігар мае правесці даследчую працу, патрэбную для свае дысэртацыі.

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Пасьля заканчэння курсу, прадбачанага ў М.І.Т. для Мастэрс Дэгрэ, у Кэмбрыдж, Масс., Юрка пераходзіць на далейшыя студыі ў Клівэлянд, Огайо, дзе ў Кэйс Інстытут оф Тэхнолёджы, мае працягваць свае студыі з мэтай атрыманьня ступені доктара ў тэхналягічных навуках.

Культура ў пэрспэктыве

ПРЫНЦЫП, ЯКІ МОЖА БЫЦЬ ЗЬВЕДЗЕНЫМ ДА
ДРЭННЫХ ВЫСНАВАЎ

Запытай юнака, ён усё ведае.

Старая кітайская пагаворка

III

Часта малыя рэчы маюць да-
лёка сягаючыя кансаквенцыі.

Нехта выходзіць з простага за-
лажэння:

Я маю пасьведчаньне аб укан-
чэньні школы. Іншыя гэткага па-
сьведчаньня ня маюць. Адсюль
раблю выснаў, што я маю раша-
ючы голас у дадзеным пытаньні.

Справа, якую маем на ўвазе,
адносіцца да беларускае мовы і
ўсяго таго, што зь ёю вяжацца.

Камплексе, у якім рэч разгорт-
ваецца, зьяўляецца ключом да
зразуменьня тых мала ўхвйтных
культурных і псыхалягічных
праяваў, якія мы сілімся выясь-
ніць, ствараючы гэтым самым
болей спрыяльныя абставіны да
разьвіцьця духовага рэсурсу, не-
абходнага для завяршэньня а-
пошніх мэтаў.

На пачатку нашага стагадзь-
дзя камплексе гэты адзначаўся
тым, што ствараў прадумовіны
да гутаркі і дыскусіяў лічаных
людзей у справе, якая ў наша-
нiўскую пару прывяла да ства-
рэння эпохі гэтага назову.

Але камплексе гэты ня меў і

ня мае сталае хвормы. Ён зна-
ходзіцца і будзе знаходзіцца ў
трансфармацыі, якая ўзалежні-
ваецца ад зьменнасьці на лепшае
таго фактару, які адыгрывае
першую ролю — чалавека.

Нядаўна я меў нагоду адве-
даць на маёй вуліцы ў Сіракуз
адну не-беларускую славянскую
сям'ю, якая прыбыла ў ЗША
пасля Другое сусьветнае вайны,
і мае тут уласны дом. У часе
гутаркі мы зыйшлі на тэму ўтры-
маньня ў належным стане дому
і эканамічнага аспэкту пры на-
яўнасьці выдаваньня кватэры
тутэйшым людзям, што жывуць
на ніжэйшым паверсе. Гаворачы
пра спажываньне вады, газу і
электрычнасьці, гаспадыня до-
му сказала: Для нас хоціць 60-
ці ватавая лямпачка, а амэры-
канцу патрэбна 100-ватавая.

Гэтае ейнае асьведчаньне
зьярнула на сябе маю ўвагу.

Існуе мусяць нейкі культурны
камплексе, які выражаецца пэў-
нымі матэрыяльнымі вартасьця-
мі. Вартасьці гэтыя, як мернік,
могуць выступаць усюды і прыў-

маць рознае выражэнне. Можна ўжываць гэткую ці іншую лямпачку; можна брыцца штодня або раз на тыдзень; можна ехаць на такім ці іншым самаходзе; можна ўжываць хустачку да носа ці проста два пальцы; можна пражыць дзень з сям'ёю за адзін даляр і можна выдаць некалькі разоў болей; можна глядзець на тэлевізыйным экране такую ці іншую праграму, або чытаць такую ці іншую кніжку. Усё тут залежыць ад духовых вартасцяў чалавека.

Тое, што здавальняла нашых бацькоў, не абавязкава мае здавальняць нас. І нашыя культурныя патрэбы насілу ці могуць здаволіць нашых дзяцей. І гэтак, як у свеце фізічным, кожны элемент паддадзены свайму праву, гэтак і ў свеце духовых вартасцяў існуюць правы, якія чалавек ня можа абыйсці. Гэта тое права, якое на працягу доўгага часу зьяля чалавека з дрэва, па якім ён "хадзіў" пры помачы сваіх чатырох канчынаў і прывяло да таго стану, калі нашчадак гэтага самага чалавека асмеліўся прыняць на сябе адказнасць, зірнуць, што робіцца на іншых плянэтах.

Вяртаючыся да нашага прадмету моўнае культуры, мы мусім сьцьвердзіць наяўнасць таго самага нейкага ўкрытага закону прыцяжэння ў бок культуры, які дзейнічае паміж намі і які мы ня можам абмінуць.

І гэтак, як ува ўсіх галінах людскога прагрэсу выступае апа-

зыцця, маючая на ўвазе абарону старога парадку, гэтаксама і ў закранутай намі дзялянцы, будзе выступаць супраціў з мэтай абароны здадуманых і псеўда-навуковых прынцыпаў зьместу і хвормы.

Усюды там, дзе людзі прагрэсу выступалі з новымі ідэямі, хвормаю і новаю культураю, знаходзіліся абаронцы старога ладу, якія ў свомым для іх адчаю і глыбокаю вераю баранілі тое, што яны ўважалі за найвышэйшую для іх сьвятасць.

Ня могучы абараніць сваіх прынцыпаў, яны адыходзілі часта ў лясы, распальвалі там г. зв. сьвяшчэнныя агні, тулілі да грудзей нейкія ім ведамья сьвятасці, наракалі, што сьвет іх не разумее і жывілі надзею, што надыйдзе час, калі людзі іх зразумеюць і ацэняць іхныя, як ім здавалася, асягненні.

Але час гэтакі не надыйшоў. Усё, што зь імі сталася, гэта тое, што ў прадоньні часу постаці іхныя зьбляднелі на гэтулькі, што нават рэдка дзе астаўся сьлед іхнага існаваньня. Сьвет пайшоў сваёю дарогаю.

У васнову кладзецца памылкавы пагляд, што, у дадзеным культурным камплексе, пасьведчаньне школьнае зьяўляецца магільным ключом да тварэньня і ацэны культурных і эстэтычных вартасцяў. Бо тое, што зьяўляецца сродкам, мы не павінны ўтоесамліваць з мэтай. Дасьведчаньне прыходзіць пазьней, калі мы толькі маем аб'ектыўны па-

гляд.

Кажны прагрэс — "пераход да вышэйшае ступені разьвіцця" — крые ў сабе свомасьць дзеяньня, падобную да дзеяньня атомаў, і, як гэтакі, ня ведае ні якіх забавязаньняў, аўтарытэтаў, перашкодаў і тэрору, і разьвіваецца паводля аднаго толькі прынцыпу, імя якому свабода.

Адкідаючы часта памылковасьць аўтарытэту і выказваючы нашыя пагляды, мы, аднак, павінны высьцерагацца, каб, зьбіваючы адзін міт, ня ўпасьці ў памылку, якая можа крыцца тады асабліва, калі мы прыймаем паставу скрайнасьці.

Мы павінны выразна і ясна на гэтым месцы сказаць, што здабываньне школьнае асьветы, асабліва ў нашым культурным камплексе, астаецца першарадным пачынаньнем, да чаго нашым абавязкам ёсьць заклікаць кажнага — ад маладога да старога, памятаючы пры гэтым, што адукаваны чалавек не абавязкава можа быць інтэлігэнтным, а інтэлігэнтны чалавек не абавязкава адукаваным.

Няхай нам дазволеным будзе зілюстраваць нашую думку наступным:

Уявем сабе, што на мэдычным факультэце дадзенага ўнівэрсытэту знаходзіцца 200 абсалвэнтаў, якія ў гэтых днях выходзяць са школы, атрымліваючы аднолькавыя пасьведчаньні аб памысным заканчэньні прадбачанага курсу. Пасьля гэтага яны праходзяць пераважна ў шпіта-

лях нейкі, прадбачаны правам дадзенае краіны, час практыкі і атрымліваюць упаўнаважаньне выконваньня прыватнае практыкі.

Цяпер, калі нейкі чалавек, чуючыся заняджаным, хоча адведаць лекара, дык, як гэта пераважна здараецца, ён ня ідзе да першага лепшага доктара, імя і агалошаньне якога ён можа знайсці ў якой-небудзь публікацыі. Перад тым, як ён адчыніць дзьверы пачакальні лекарскага кабінэту, чалавек пераважна дарогаю гутарак, дарогаю рэкамандацыяў даведваецца нешта пра дадзенага лекара і, знайшоўшы апошняга адказваючым ягонаму даверу, тады ідзе з візытаю да доктара.

Чаму зацікаўлены чалавек гэта робіць? — Ці-ж ня ўсе гэтыя лекары закончылі тую самую школу? Ці-ж ня ўсе яны атрымалі аднолькавыя пасьведчаньні і рэкамандацыі як адпаведных для службы церпячаму чалавеку?

Церпячы чалавек не абавязкава ідзе па лініі нашых разважаньняў. Падсьведама ён вычувае нешта іншае, што можна было-б зрэасумаваць наступна:

Усе лекары маюць аднолькавыя пасьведчаньні, адбылі і адбываюць практыку. Але справа на гэтым не канчаецца. Тут выступае легіён фактараў, які немагчыма вылушчыць коротка: Лекар — гэта індывідуум. І як гэтакі, ён розьніцца ад кажнага іншага падобнага да сябе. Ле-

кар можа мець розны падход да чалавека, розную *здольнасць* . . . Гэтым, сярод іншага, паясьняецца, чаму адзін зь іх выконвае сваю вольную прафэсію ў вялікім людным месцы, а іншы ўсё сваё жьцьцё скаратае ў западным маленькім мястэчку. Імя іншага лекара ўвойдзе на бачыны летапісу, на якім віднеюць гэтакія імёны, як Гіпакрат, Пастэр, Кох, Блейкўэл, Сальк . . . , а пра імя іншага лекара, апрача ягонае жонкі (калі ён жанаты), нішто ня будзе ведаць.

Аднойчы ў трыццаціх гадох, будучы прасгуджаным, я адведаў аднаго лекара ў малым мястэчку на Беларусі. Доктар называўся З—ч. Як звычайна пры падобных візытах, лекар пытаецца мяне, ці я хварэў і г. п. Я адказаў, што бывалі прастуды, і пры гэтым успомніў, што ў маёй вайскавай кніжцы недзе нанесены з перад дзесяццю гадамі запіс: *zgrzeszenie prawego szczytu płuc*. У міжчасе лекар папрасіў мяне абнажыць грудзі. Ён слухаў, стукаў, паціскаў і пасля гэтага з павагаю сказаў, што было б пажаданым, калі б я мог на нейкі час паехаць на адпачынак у кліматычна здаровую ваколіцу. Прызнаюся, ён учыніў на мяне адпаведнае ўражаньне. — Калі пасля гэтага лекар сядзеў пры сталае і выпісваў нейкі фармуляр, прыводзячы свой вонквы выгляд у аратнасць, я заглянуў праз плячо доктара, і, на маё здзіўленьне, я прычы-

таў ягоную свежую запіс дыягнозы: *zgrzeszenie prawego szczytu płuc*. — Цяпер я адразу вылячыўся. Бо скуль гэткае падабенства дыягнозы пасля дзесяці гадоў. Мне выдалося, што гутарка пра свежае паветра — гэта прыказка: "Памога, не памога, але не пашкодзіць". Я падзякаваў яму і выйшаў аздавоўленым.

Кітайская пагаворка кажа, што зямля хавае памылку лекара.

Тое, што часамі мы назіраем сярод лекараў, мы можам бачыць сярод людзей кажнае прафэсіі: сярод інжынераў, пабудовы якіх часамі завальваюцца, сярод сьвятароў, сярод адвакатаў, шаўцоў . . .

Гэтае самае — тут прыходзім мы да сутнасці нашае тэмы — мы можам знайсці і сярод філялёгаў. Розьніца толькі будзе тая, што, калі, скажам, сярод лекараў мы маем выбар з двух сот чалавек, дык у галіне нашае філялёгіі мы маем толькі "аднаго" чалавека. Самы бяскрытычны чытач прызнаціме нам, што тут мы маем вельмі абмежаваны выбар. Мы знаходзімся ў сляпым завулку. Усё пастаўлена на адну стаўку!

І, як гэта дзіўным нам выдавацца можа, штодзенная практыка прыводзіць нас да лічных доказаў і кажа нам, што часта добры прынып можа быць зьведзеным да дрэнных выснаваў.



The Three Partitions of Poland

By Harry I. Piotrowski

The seeds of the division of the Polish-Lithuanian union by Russia, Prussia, and Austria may be traced to 1386 when Jagellon, Duke of Lithuania, married Jadwiga, heiress to the Polish throne, thus initiating the union of the two kingdoms.¹ More directly, the sorrows of this confederation may be said to have begun with the Union of Lublin of 1569, which created the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. For brevity's sake, the term Poland shall be used throughout this paper. After 1569, the monarchy became elective when Sigismund Augustus died childless. These elected rulers, however, were at the mercy of the nobility (*szlachta*) who lawfully could refuse obedience to their monarch. One of the main features of this type of governmental institution was the "democratic" *liberum veto* which made it possible for only one member of the General Crown Diet to prevent the passage of a proposed measure.²

Beside refusing to bow to their nominal rulers, the nobles also opposed any alleviation of the lot of the serfs who composed the vast majority of the population and on whose support this "*szlachta* nation" could never really count. The Diet was transformed into an arena for the petty straggles of the nobles who only in rare cases did not neglect the welfare of the union. The land was worked by the abused serfs and frequently laid waste by the bitter straggles among the adherents of various faiths.³ Although the Polish historian Oscar Halecki maintains that the oligarchy was unable to introduce measures to strengthen the nation because of constant foreign intervention⁴ and that Providence had punished the Poles for losing their deep religious faith,⁵ the blame for the degeneration of the country must be placed squarely upon the shoulders on the corrupt nobility since they were the ones who wielded political power. No wonder that the nationalistic Prussian historian Heinrich von Sybel was able to claim that the Poles had committed suicide.

When in October 1763, King Augustus III of Poland and Elector of Saxony died, Catherine II of Russia made the initial move leading to the partitions. In order to strengthen Russian influences in Poland which may be traced back to the days of Peter the Great when Augustus II of Poland was forced to place himself under Russian "protection" from Sweden, Catherine decided to place a Pole, upon the Polish throne, Stanislas Poniatowski, one of her former lovers,⁶ who spent three years in Russia as the private secretary to the British ambassador Sir Hanbury-Williams. Backed by Russian military might and a Prusso-Russian agreement to act in concert in matters relating to Poland, Poniatowski was "elected" king by the Diet in September 1764. Catherine now virtually ruled Poland through her ambassador to Warsaw,

Nicholas Repnin. It was in this year that Russia ceased to renew its alliance of the Seven Years' war and adhered to the policy of the Northern Accord advocated by Nikita Panin who greatly influenced Catherine's foreign policy during the first half of her reign. Panin's scheme called for an alliance between the North European nations directed against France and Austria. Poland, being dependant upon the mercy of its neighbors, was in an uneviable position since the thoughts of partition naturally occurred to the monarchs of Russia and Prussia. The statement of Louis XIV's of France that "to aggrandize oneself was the worthiest and most agreeable occupation of a sovereign"⁷ was quite readily accepted by the rulers of eighteenth century Europe, Catherine, Frederick the Great of Prussia, and Maria Theresa of Austria being no exceptions. They waited only for an excuse to partition their weak and practically defenseless neighbor. They did not have to wait long.

After the Seven Years' War the Polish nation experienced a remarkable rejuvenation. The need for reform was realized by a considerable number of the nobility and led by the powerful Czartoryski family, to which Poniatowski was related, the *liberum veto* was abolished and the financial, economic, and military institutions of the country were remodeled. The reactionary faction of the nobility, in turn, formed confederations to oppose the reforms and appealed to Repnin who was able, by exiling several reform-minded members of the Diet to Siberia, to restore the old order. In March 1768, another confederation was formed in the Ukrainian city of Bar which threatened to oust not only the Russians but also the weak Poniatowski. It was at this time that the king and the Czartoryskis blundered in calling for the assistance of Russian troops. They were under the illusion that the tsarina's forces would return home as soon as order was established throughout the land.⁸ The Confederation of Bar was soon routed by the brilliant general Alexander Suvorov although France sent some aid to the insurgents and Turkey entered the war on the Polish side.

At the same time the problems created by the Roman Catholic persecution of the Protestants and Greek Orthodox in Poland gave Frederick and Catherine an opportunity to intervene in the internal affairs of the nation. It is doubtful if either monarch cared for the rights of the persecuted minorities. Still, the Russian historian S. M. Solovyev depicts Catherine as a very peaceful individual and contends that the partitions were caused mainly by the Polish refusal to grant the dissidents political rights.⁹ Frederick's interest in Poland can be found in his desire to connect East Prussia with his western territories, not to reconquer lands originally ruled by the Teutonic Order.¹⁰ This viewpoint is even held by the chauvenistic German his-

orian Heinrich von Treitschke who states that Frederick was not motivated to reclaim what Treitschke considers originally German lands.¹¹

It appears doubtful that Catherine, as frequently stated, wanted to maintain a weak Russian-dominated Poland and was duped by Prussia into going along with the divisions since the might of Russia could have prohibited any unilateral action by Prussia. The Russian empress in all probability was guided by the tenet of Louis XIV, as was the Austrian queen. Their insatiable greed drove them to the first step in removing Poland from the political map of Europe. The answer to the academic question whether it was Catherine or Frederick who *first* suggested the partition is unimportant; besides, as the Austrian historian Adolf Beer points out, the thoughts of partition were mulled over by monarchs for over a century.¹² It has been stated that Maria Theresa is the only one who has never been accused of inventing the partition,¹³ but it was under her rule that Austria invaded the Polish territory of Zip in 1769. Although Perkins state that she opposed the policy of her foreign minister Prince Kaunitz and her son, the future Joseph II,¹⁴ it seems doubtful that she could not have prevented this action if she did not approve. Kaplan maintains that this move by Austria upset the balance of power, thus causing the intervention of the other two powers and the initial division of the hapless nation.¹⁵

In August 1772, the three powers signed a treaty of partition in St. Petersburg by which Russia received the White Russian lands of Vitebsk, Polotsk, and Minsk; Austria received Galicia; while Prussia took Posen and Polish Pomerania. These three tried to justify their actions because of the anarchy in Poland. V. O. Kluchevsky, the eminent Russian historian, questions the wisdom of the Russian actions. He maintains, as do others, that Russian interests would have been served better if the tsarina could have retained control over a nominally independent Poland which, strengthened by the measures of the Czartoryskis, could have developed into a valuable ally against the Ottoman empire.²¹ Instead, both Prussia and Austria were strengthened the rest of Europe standing idly by.

Despite these events the renaissance in Poland continued. Hugo Kołłątaj, as rector of the Jagellonian University at Cracow did much to raise the standards of that institutions,¹⁶ while Stanislas Konarski, a member of the Order of Piarists, introduced education for the outcast and destitute.¹⁷ Cultural establishments were erected throughout Warsaw between 1760—1780 and Stanislas Staszic urged his countrymen to work for a strong Poland. In 1790, he wrote in passionate terms in his *Warnings for Poland* that

Five-sixth of the nation stands before my eyes. I see millions of human beings, of whom some go half-naked, others are clad in

skins or rough home-spun — but all are lean, wasted, covered with hair and black with soot. Their eyes are sunken, they toil day in day out, torn by asthma. Moody, stupid and impored upon, they feel little and think little. That last is their greatest good fortune. Scarcely a single reasoning soul can be seen among them . . . The name *chlop* is held in the lowest disdain.¹⁸

In 1788, Andrew Zamoyski was commissioned by the Diet to draft a new code of government and on May 3, 1791, a new constitution was passed by acclamation in the Diet. The *liberum veto* was abolished, while the monarchy was strengthened and became hereditary. Russia at that time was engaged in a conflict with Turkey and therefore was then unable to object to this show of Polish independence. A Prussian-Polish alliance had been concluded with the new king of Prussia, Frederick William II, and it appeared that the Polish drive to establish a strong, free nation might be successful. However, in 1792, Catherine, after disposing of Ottomans, was able to answer the call for aid by the pro-Russian Potocki family who had formed a confederation at Targowica. Poniatowski halted his ineffectve military maneuvers and submitted to the dictates of the tsarina. A Diet was summoned at Grodno in June 1793, to sanction the second partition of Poland to which the Prussians, who had broken their treaty of 1788 with Poland, and the Russians had agreed in 1792. This "dumb session" at Grodno, at which no Polish representative consented to the new outrage, only to have the silence interpreted by the partitioning powers as a sanction of this act, was at the mercy of the victors.

The men of the Four-Year Diet had worked hard for reforms (1788-1792) since they knew they may be partitioned again. These individuals were able to save the Polish nationality by giving its people a renewed faith and ideals to cling to.¹⁹ Catherine, however, stated that she was not opposing reform, but only Jacobinism. Since Prussia was bitterly opposed to Austria at the time, it is only natural for Sybel to maintain that Austria's Leopold II attempted to form a Polish-Saxon hereditary monarchy with the aid of the Diet which, of course, forced Frederick William to take part in the second partition of Poland.²⁰ However, what actually had happened was that the Poles, who had paid for their degeneration with the first partition, were forced to pay for their regeneration with the second division. Poniatowski had made the fatal error of attempting to reason with two power-lusting monarchs. Russia took lands in White Russia, Volhynia, Podolia, and Lithuania and the Prussians obtained territories in the heart of Poland, including the cities of Danzig and Thorn. Austria was not invited to the looting party this time. While the first partition did not seal the fate of the nation and in some cases may be regarded as a

“salutary operation”,²¹ the second was to be the ruin of Poland.

After this latest Prusso-Russian act of aggression, the Poles rose again in a bid for freedom before their fatherland was to be subjugated again. Under the able leadership of the valiant Thaddeus Kosciuszko who had fought with George Washington in the American war for independence, the lesser gentry rose first at Cracow in March 1794, and the following month defeated the Russians at Raclavica. The Russians were then driven out of Warsaw and Vilna by other uprisings and as a result Frederick William and Catherine hastened to conclude a pact which called for joint intervention in Poland. In November 1794, Suvorov stormed and sacked Praga, a suburb of Warsaw on the right bank of the Vistula. The resulting slaughter soon broke the illequipped patriot troops.²² By that time Kosciuszko had been wounded in a previous battle and been captured by Suvorov. With the fall of their gallant leader, Poland had ceased to exist as a political entity.

In October 1795, the third and final division of the once mighty Polish-Lithuanian kingdom occurred. When it came to allotting the territories, Catherine favored Austria over Prussia for its benevolent neutrality during the campaign against Kosciuszko's forces and also to restore the balance which had been upset by the second partition when Austria was excluded. Leopold II received Cracow, Lublin, and Sandomir while Prussia took Warsaw. The Russians obtained the long coveted Duchy of Courland and the rest of Lithuania. Europe once again for various reasons stood by and watched. During the third division the question was no longer how much land should be taken from Poland, but how much each robber should take from the other two.²³ Lord also stated that if this partition would have only included the two Germanic powers, it may never have taken place, since either side may have possibly passed up the chance for an acquisition just to deprive the other of an increase in territory.

Poniatowski received political asylum in Russia where he lived his remaining years. His actions are subject to wide interpretations by historians. While some claim that he sold out to the Russians, that he always desired to deliver his homeland to the empress, and that he worked to undermine the Diet's achievements, there are others, and they have the better argument, that he was weak in character, trusting the Russians who at that time were far advanced in the game of *Realpolitik*, and indcisive. After his country had ceased to exist there was no other place for him to go than the country of the German-born tsarina who had created a puppet out of him. Catherine had achieved what she set out to do although it is debateable whether her policies were conducted in the best interest of the vast Russian empire. She had allowed Prussia, which was barely recovering from the brouncing it had received by Russian troops during the Seven Years' War, to

expand its frontiers eastward and at the same time allowed the Austrians to become the overlords of a considerable number of Greek Orthodox Slavs. It was over the rights of these Slavs that the empress supposedly had gone to war against the Poles in the first place; now many were to be dominated by another Catholic power. Prussia took most of the "ethnic" Polish lands, however, it is only due to the accident of geography that the Russians did not incorporate into their empire a large Polish population, and not, as it sometimes pointed out, because the Russians were only reclaiming what had belonged to them at one time. V. I. Lenin called the three partitions of Poland acts of imperialism. His conclusion, although derived from prove a particular point of view, appears to be closer to the truth than the justifications given by the various nationalist historians for the destruction of a nearly defenseless state.

Poland had thus vanished, only to reappear after the First World War. During the reign of Paul of Russia it was even agreed to outlaw the name Poland. The three partitioning powers had all thought that they had acted in their self-interest yet, especially in the case of Russia, the dismemberment of the once proud nation did not bring the victors many gains nor did the partitions settle anything. Prussia was soon to lose Warsaw and Austria was to be plagued with the problem of the national minorities which lasted until the First World War. One can argue that these problems are still not solved. Poles were to join Napoleon Bonaparte in his march to Moscow and they were to rise against their Russian overlords in 1830 and 1863. Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin tried once again to settle the so-called Polish question and in 1956 the Poles followed in Kosciuszko's footsteps to attempt to maintain their independence from a foreign master.

NOTES

1. Oswald P. Backus III maintains that this alliance started the political competition between the Poles and the Lithuanians and established cultural diversities which were responsible for preventing the establishment of an effective union by the Jagellonian dynasty. "The Problem of Unity in the Polish-Lithuanian State", *Slavic Review*, XXII, No. 2 (June, 1963), 411-431. See also Joseph Jakstas' article "How Firm was the Polish-Lithuanian Federation?" *Slavic Review*, XXII, No. 2 (June, 1963), 442-449.
2. For a detailed analysis of the Polish governmental institutions during these times, see P. Skwarzyński, "The Constitution of Poland Before the Partitions", *The Cambridge History of Poland, 1697-1935* (Cambridge University Press, 1941), 49-71.
3. An illuminating account of the social classes in Poland is presented by Nikolai Gogol in his novel *Taras Bulba*, 1835.

4. Oscar Halecki, "Why was Poland Partitioned?" *Slavic Review*, XXII, No. 2 (June, 1963), 441. This is a reply to the aforementioned article by Oswald P. Backus III.
5. Oscar Halecki, *History of Poland* (New York: Roy Publishers, 1943), 213.
6. Anyone searching for a topic for a dictorial dissertation may want to answer the following question: Did Catherine discard Ponia-towski or *vice versa*? Opinions differ.
7. Cited by Robert Howard Lord in his excellent study of *The Second Partition of Poland: A Study in Diplomatic History* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harward University Press), 503.
8. Herbert H. Kaplan, *The First Partition of Poland* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), presented by the East Central European Studies program of Columbia University, 183. This is probably the best presentation on the initial partition.
9. S. Ssolowjeff, *Geschichte des Falles von Polen* (Gotha, 1865), translated from the Russian by J. Sporer. The author bases his account on Russian sources and his interpretation is highly nationalistic.
10. See the brief article by James Breck Perkins which portrays Maria Theresa in a favorable light, "The Partition of Poland", *American Historical Review*, II, No. 1 (October, 1896), 76-92; for Frederick's reasons, 80.
11. Treitschke wrote in 1862 that Frederick should have been driven by the more noble aim of reconquering German lands only. *Origins of Prussianism: The Teutonic Knights* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1942), 158-159.
12. Adoll Beer, *Die Erste Theilung Polens*, vol. II (Vienna, 1873). 319. Volume III lists documents from mainly the Vienna archives, however, the archives of Berlin were also consulted. Not a chauvinist, Beer, however, does portray Austria's role in a favorable light.
13. Katharine Anthony, *Catherine the Great* (Garden City, N. Y.: Garden City Publishing Co., 1925), 196.
14. Perkins, "The Partition . . .",
15. Kaplan, *The First . . .*, 187. This appears to be too strong a statement since Russia, and especially Prussia, would in all probability soon have found a cause for partition. George Vernadsky seems to be of the same opinion as Kaplan in his *Political and Diplomatic History of Russia* (Boston: Little, Brown, and Co., 1936), 265.
16. Szczepan K. Zimmer, "The Jagellonian University in Cracow", *The Polish Review*, VIII, No. 1 (Winter, 1963), 63.
17. William Rose, Stanisław Konarski: Preceptor of Poland, "The Slavonic Review", IV, No. 10 (June, 1925), 23-41.

18. Cited by William Rose in his article on "Stanislaw Staszic, 1755-1826", *The Slavonic and East European Review*, XXXIII, No. 81 (June, 1955), 303. The same author has written an account of the history of the city of Warsaw in which he presents the city's establishments of cultural institutions between 1760-1780. *The Slavonic and East European Review*, "Slavonic Cities: Warsaw", XVII, No. 50, (January, 1939), 420. For further information of the rejuvenation of Poland see, B. Dembiński, "The Age of Stanislas Augustus and the National Revival", *Cambridge History* . . ., 112-136.
19. Lord, *The Second* . . ., 491.
20. Heinrich von Sybel, "Polens Untergang und der Revolutionskrieg", *Aufschlusse Ueber die jungsten Ereignisse in Polen: Nebst sechzehn authentischen Aktenstuecken* (Mainz, 1846), 66, 71-72.
21. Lord, *The Second* . . ., 484.
22. For a detailed account see Heinrich von Sybel's *Geschichte der Revolutionszeit von 1789 bis 1795*), vol. III (Duesseldorf, 1877), 262-265. The author has written a full account of Prussia's role in the third partition, although full of prejudices, 145-293.
23. For a brief, scholarly account see R. H. Lord's "The Third Partition of Poland", *Slavonic Review*, III (1925), 481-498.
24. Kluchevsky, A. *History of Russia*, vol. V (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, Ltd., 1931), 18-22.

ПА РАДКОХ ДРУКУ

"НАВІНЫ ЗЬ БЕЛАРУСІ" — гэта скромная аб'ёмом публікацыя, прысвечаная "агляду савецкага друку", як гаворыць падзагалавак.

Выдаўцом "Навінаў" зьяўляецца Камітэт Радыя Свабода.

Асаблівасцяй "Навінаў" — гэта "выпіскі зь беларускага савецкага друку", падлючыя "характэрныя факты савецкага жыцця". І ў гэтым дачыненні "Навіны" твораць сабою новасць сярод беларускага друку на эміграцыі.

Новасцю гэтага друку было-б тое, што ён фактычна хоча прадставіць савецкі друк і савецкую думку, ці баржджэй эвалюцыю яе, так, як бачыў-бы гэта аб'ект фатаграфічнага апарату: гэта значыць бесстаронна, бяз сугэстыі ацэны са стараны рэдакцыі, пакадаючы кры-

тыцызм і ацэну бачанага самому чытачу.

У гэтай аб'ектыўнасці, здаецца, першы раз у беларускім друкаваным слове, адчуваецца сільны ўплыў, характэрны амэрыканскаму спосабу падыходу да рэчаіснасці. — Высокі чалавек не шманае, калі яго хто-небудзь назаве нізкім; вучоны чалавек астанецца спакойным, калі яго хто-небудзь крытыкуе, гэтаксама, яг багаты астанецца зраўнаважаным, калі нехта назаве яго бедным. У гэтай паставе знаходзіцца глыбака ўкрытая веліч. З гэтага пункту гледжання беларусы, якія займаюцца пашырэннем беларускага слова, павінны прааналізаваць гэты падход да да-

(Працяг на бач. 24)

A Short History of Byelorussian Nationalism

By George Piotrowski

Byelorussian nationalism is based on the existence of a Byelorussian nation in the form of the Grand Duchy of Byelorussia and Lithuania from 1385 to 1569. Byelorussian culture developed in the 15th century and reached a high point around 1500, being comparable to any culture in Europe at that time. The Grand Duchy disappeared in 1569, being incorporated into the "Polish Commonwealth". Byelorussia became Russian territory in the 1772, 1793 and 1795 during the partitions of Poland.

Ideas of Byelorussian nationalism lay latent from the break-up of the Grand Duchy until 1861, when Dunin-Martsinkevich wrote an opera called *The Peasant Woman*. In the opera he expressed "... the idea of equal rights of Byelorussian with other languages..." In other plays he tried to say that Byelorussians are equal with other people.

On the very day of the premiere (of *the Peasant Woman*) a decree was issued prohibiting shows in the language of the common people... The performance took place — but only because the local authorities had given their permission previously. After this, the opera was staged illegally in... other cities and towns..."²

At that time the populace was split up into two main groups — the Polish landlords and the Byelorussian peasants. There was very little mobility between the two, and the peasants welcomed writings of an egalitarian nature. Egalitarianism is not the same as nationalism but it is a big step toward nationalism from an uncaring attitude.

In 1863 the western parts of the Russian Empire revolted; under the leadership of Kastuś Kalinoŭski the Byelorussians took an active part in the revolt. A revolutionary newspaper, "*Mužyckaja Prawda*" (Peasants' Truth), was printed in the Byelorussian language. The revolt failed because the various ethnic groups were not united; each group wanted to gain its own independence.

Following the unsuccessful revolt, most of the nationalist activity became cultural in nature. The output of Byelorussian nationalist literature increased from its modest beginnings in the 1860's steadily until the 20th century. "The Russian Revolution of 1905, though abortive, gave an impetus to the Byelorussian ideal, and for the first time put it in direct and open contact with the masses..."³

The paper *Naša Niva* (Our Soil) became the focal point of Byelorussian nationalist activity. Its expressed purpose was to awaken artistic and national consciousness in the Byelorussians. The paper appears to have succeeded quite well, so well in fact that by the eve of the World War I "... it seemed that Byelorussia had everything which might be required for statehood: a territory, a people, and a language."⁴

Byelorussian nationalism was able to grow in the period preceding World War I because it centered on Byelorussian culture rather than on political issues. Whenever politics came up they were quickly suppressed. Such was the case with the predecessor to *Naša Niva*, *Naša Dola* (Our Lot). This paper was suspended by the Russian authorities after only six issues for revolutionary and separatist tendencies. As a result, nationalist writings did not clamor too loudly for independence, but rather sought to build a foundation for the Byelorussian identity.

World War I upset these plans somewhat. The Germans controlled Byelorussia most of the time; they favored the creation of a separate Byelorussian nation. An attempt was made to re-establish the Grand Duchy but met with failure when the Lithuanians, who sought their own autonomy, refused to cooperate.

The Russian Revolution brought a measure of calm to the eastern front. Many Byelorussian nationalist groups appeared, most of them working toward national autonomy. The Bolshevik revolution strengthened Byelorussian nationalism by uniting the people against the Bolsheviks.

On December 17, 1917, the Great Byelorussian Council convened in Miensk with 1,872 delegates. Although these delegates were not uniformly selected, most of the nation was represented. "... The Convention was overwhelmingly non—if not anti-Bolshevik..."⁵ On the night of the 18th the Red Army appeared and ordered the Convention closed. Some of the officers of the Convention were arrested when they objected; those that escaped established a single, albeit underground, authority. An open revolt foiled when its plans were uncovered and its leaders arrested.

When the Germans regained control of the area the Council met again in Miensk on March 25, 1918 and declared the independence of the Byelorussian National Republic:

A year ago, the peoples of Byelorussia, together with all the peoples of Russia, threw off the yoke of Russian tsarism which, taking no advice from the people, had plunged our land into the blaze of war that ruined most of our cities and towns.

Today we, the Rada (Council) of the Byelorussian National Republic, cast off from our country the last chains of the political servitude that had been imposed by Russian tsarism upon free and independent land. From now on, the Byelorussian National Republic is to be a free and independent power. The peoples of Byelorussia themselves, through their own Constituent Assembly, will decide upon the future relations of Byelorussia with other states . . . ”

The independence of the Byelorussian National Republic was recognized *de jure* by the Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Finland, Poland, Turkey, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Armenia, and Georgia. It was recognized *de facto* by most other countries of the world.¹

That the independence of the BNR (Byelorussian National Republic) was due to the grace of political events cannot be denied. The Germans gave it the support it needed to get started, but on other hand kept it in check. The Germans did not let the Byelorussians build up their own army, nor anything which would enable them to strike out on their own. The collapse of the Central Powers removed support from the BNR and the Allies failed to replace it. Poland and the Baltic states were supported by the Allies, while Byelorussia was left at the mercy of Poland and Russia. The BNR had no opportunity to raise an army and was forced to go into exile when Poland and Russia moved in to divide the country between them. In the ensuing war the BNR made an offer of military aid in the form of men to the Poles, but the offer was rejected.

When the Poles gained control of most of Byelorussia the BNR returned from exile. The Poles tried to quiet down nationalist demands, but as the pressure increased the underground activity threatened to become an open revolt.

A split developed in the BNR over the issue of union with Poland; the majority favored independence. Poland, not tolerating two Byelorussian governments, arrested the more prominent members of that part of the government which desired independence from Poland; others went underground or escaped to Lithuania. The group favoring union with Poland was set up as a puppet government.

Meanwhile the Polish-Russian war continued. In the fall of 1920 about 10,000 Byelorussians rose up in revolt against both the Poles and the Russians.

. . . For five weeks the Slucak brigade resisted the overwhelming forces of the Red Army . . . Only the use of so-called “international” Communist troops finally forced the Slucak

patriots to retreat to the Polish border, where they were disarmed and interned...⁸

Some of the patriots returned to the Slucak woods, where the guerilla movement continued until the 1930's. The Slucak uprising was the major effort of the Byelorussians to obtain their independence. The Red Army proved to be too much for them and the Byelorussian revolt was crushed.

Finally, on March 28, 1921 the Treaty of Riga gave West Byelorussia to Poland, and the most part of ethnographic territory became the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

In their effort to stamp out all traces of Russia the Poles aided the Byelorussian nationalists. "In 1922 the people voted their own ticket in the (Polish) national elections, and sent three senators and eleven deputies to the Polish Sejm (Assembly)..." The Byelorussian representatives took their office seriously, but their zeal alarmed the Poles, who feared that Byelorussianism might turn into a subversive movement of real magnitude.

By the end of the 1920's Poland began repressive actions, such as the closing of Byelorussian schools. "... Byelorussian youth was given the choice of becoming Polish or remaining illiterate..."¹⁰ In the 1930's all Byelorussian nationalist organizations were either dissolved by Polish authorities or forced to curtail their activities drastically. By depriving the Byelorussian nationalists of leadership the Poles thought to turn the loyalty of the people toward Poland, but did not succeed.

The Byelorussians in Poland were too small a minority to put up an effective resistance against Polish oppression. Their political activity was limited to local government. Consequently the most active nationalism went underground or into exile. According to some estimates over 100,000 Byelorussians emigrated from Poland. Byelorussian activity centered in the Baltic States, later spreading to Western Europe. Byelorussian students in many countries joined to form an All-Byelorussian Student Union abroad. These were soon to display an even more aggressive nationalistic spirit than did their fathers, though younger leadership did not come to the fore until World War II.

In the BSSR nationalism was given a seemingly free hand immediately following World War I. Byelorussian culture had a renaissance, the arts flourished, and many Byelorussian schools were opened. Byelorussians were in control of all aspects of the administration of the BSSR except the army which was almost entirely (98.3%) non-Byelorussian.¹¹

As long as the Byelorussians professed loyalty to the Soviet ideal and did not come into open conflict with it the Byelorussians were allowed to do as they pleased. The progress of Byelorussian culture so impressed many exiles that they returned to the BSSR. A large part of the BNR, in exile in Prague, was convinced to give up its demands and to return home. However, not all was as rosy as it might seem. Writings were censored for excessive patriotism; the study of certain authors was prohibited due to their "bourgeois nationalism". Signs were beginning to indicate that Byelorussian culture was slowly being forced into the Russian mold.

By 1929 nationalism had lost its usefulness to the Russians and purges, which continued until 1938, effectively liquidated all Byelorussian nationalist, except some writers like Janka Kupala and Jakub Kolas, whom the Russians exploited for their propaganda. An intensive campaign of Russification made great changes in the Byelorussian way of life.

It is interesting to note that both Poland and the USSR dealt in a similar manner with the Byelorussians. After the war both Russians and the Poles left the Byelorussians alone, as they had enough to worry about in the rebuilding of their countries. The Byelorussians suffered greater losses than either of them, and so created no real worries until about the late 1920's. As Byelorussian nationalism became too insistent in its demands the authorities on both sides of the border clamped the lid on nationalism to prevent the outbreak of armed revolts.

World War II brought with it six years of confusion. The Russians took over West Byelorussia in 1939 and staged an election there. Only the Communist party put up candidates, and they won, with some help from the Red Army. After the election the nationalist leaders of West Byelorussia were invited to Miensk, and the few who accepted soon disappeared.

Byelorussian nationalist activity flared up in Lithuania, but the Russians soon liquidated this stronghold of Byelorussian nationalism when they annexed Lithuania into the USSR. The few leaders who escaped were offered hospitality and facilities by the Germans.

In 1940 the Russians began to russify the western part of Byelorussia, the same way they russified the eastern part before the war. The Germans displaced the Russians in June 1941. In leaving, the Russians employed Stalin's "scorched earth" policy, destroying all they could, and leaving the people with no means of subsistence. This action was not soon forgotten by the Byelorussians.

The Germans followed the same pattern as the previous occu-

pants of Byelorussia: first they let the natives have their own way (up to a point) and, as demands got louder, the natives' freedom was curtailed. One thing should be noted: even though they were "...brought up in a totalitarian state, the people set out quietly to build a democratic order..."²², taking over the local governments. Since the nationalist leadership at home had been decimated by the Poles and Soviets, nationalist leaders came from the ranks of the returned emigres from West Byelorussia, politically more advanced and educated, and Byelorussian nationalism was able to become a leading force.

In the summer of 1942 nationalist activity was driven underground by the Germans. The recall of freed prisoners of war to POW camps and the forced draft of native labor for Germany drove many people to the woods and marshes, where they formed guerrilla units to fight the Germans, Russians, or anyone else who seemed hostile to them. The guerrilla warfare hindered rather than helped nationalism. "...Having no unity of purpose except survival and vengeance, they lacked only leadership and supplies to make them a formidable threat in the German rear."²³ This disunity was in part due to the partition of Byelorussia in 1921, and partly due to divided loyalties. There were four major groups of guerrilla units: Jews, nationalists, neutral, and Soviets. The Russians were a demoralizing agent, luring rebels into their camps with offers of food, supplies, and pardon for political sins. When the Germans organized anti-guerrilla units, the warfare became a civil war, with the same kind of people fighting on both sides. It seemed as if the society had disintegrated under the pressure imposed on it.

In 1944 the German policy changed and the Byelorussians were allowed to form their own national government. On January 22, 1944, a Byelorussian Central Council was formed of fourteen members, picked by Astroŭski, and confirmed by the German Generalkommissar. The BCR (Byelorussian Central Council) called general elections to the Second Byelorussian Convention, which was held in Miensk on June 27, 1944. The Convention declared itself as the rightful government of Byelorussia, reaffirming the declaration of independence of March 25, 1918. However, the government again depended on the Germans for support, and when the support was withdrawn the BCR went into exile. Vakar decries the fact that the Second All-Byelorussian Congress did not speak out against the Nazi German regime. There was no point in doing that, however, since all that would have accomplished would have been to force withdrawal of support entirely right then and there, put the leaders in prison, and

bring about the end of the BCR.

After the war the many Byelorussians who left voluntarily or otherwise with the Germans were replaced by immigrants from other parts of the USSR.

The wholesale purge of collaborators, nationalists, even neutrals suspected of divided loyalties, was ordered after liberation. How many thousands (some writers say millions) have been jailed or deported will perhaps never be known, since even men who had done a carpenter's job for the Germans received a three-year term.¹⁴

The Kremlin is now placing emphasis on symbols of a separate Byelorussian identity while in reality it is ruthlessly destroying all real foundations of Byelorussian nationhood. Byelorussian culture is forcible brought closer to the Russian. Scholars in the humanities are afraid to take up independent study of any kind, fearing recriminations of the type experienced in the 1930's. "There have been reports from the refugees that the city people avoid using Byelorussian in the streets lest they be suspected of bourgeois nationalism..."¹⁵ Byelorussian intellectuals have been systematically destroyed and the social void filled by the new intelligentsia of Stalin vintage.

The job of keeping Byelorussian nationalism alive has fallen to the immigrants who face the problem of maintaining effective communication with the people at home. The new emigration is by far the largest in the history of the Byelorussian nation. Representing a cross section of the country, these emigrants first settled in West Germany and eventually scattered over the free part of the globe.

The leadership of the emigrants split into two groups soon after the second World War. Astroŭski reinstated the BCR and appealed to the Byelorussians to recognize the BCR as the only legitimate representative of the Byelorussian nation. This was to counter the claims of the BNR, which in 1947 set up an authoritarian system of government to be in effect until free elections become possible in the old country. The two groups have about equal support among the emigrants. Both groups claim to have extensive contacts with the old country, where "... thousands of Byelorussian heroes are scattered in the forests and depths of our country and, almost unarmed, are attacking tanks and armored patrols of the Communist police and troops..."¹⁶ Some sources say that all resistance was liquidated by 1946, but the facts are difficult to verify.

Cultural activity among the Byelorussian emigrants is high, with several magazines and newspapers appearing regularly in the

Byelorussian language. Even though the young generation grew up in a foreign culture their nationalism is as high as, if not surpassing, that of their fathers. The Byelorussian emigration may be split on who is the rightful government-exile; this is nothing unusual and attempts are being made to bring the two groups together. They are, however, united in their hope of seeing their homeland free again. The people in Byelorussia are kept aware of the fact that the emigrants have contact with all the major governments, and have made their desires known to them. Several radio programs per week in Byelorussian over Radio Free Europe keep the hopes of the people alive.

The study has shown that Byelorussia was not able to establish its own form of government without foreign help. The Germans in World War I helped to set up a national government, composed entirely of Byelorussians, under the military protection of Germany. The BSSR supposedly followed the same pattern, but after 1929 the government was taken over by Russians. Today the leaders of the emigration hope that the West will help them establish themselves in their homeland. There is no doubt in their minds that the people now living in the BSSR will reject Communism and even stand up to fight against it if given the opportunity to do so. The hope of the emigrants lies with the West in the defeat of Communism. They are certain that nationalism is still alive in Byelorussia, and if given a chance will grow and flourish.

NOTES

1. Seduro, Vladimir I., *The Byelorussian Theater and Drama*, Edwards Bros., Ann Arbor, Michigan, 1955, p. 34.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 35.
3. Vakar, Nicholas P., *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956, p. 85.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 92.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 99.
6. *Ibid.*, p. 103.
7. Liévin, "Byelorussian Political Movement", *Byelorussian Youth*, III, (January-March, 1961), p. 10.
8. Liévin, "Byelorussia Between Two World Wars", *Byelorussian Youth*, III, (April-June, 1961), p. 6.
9. Vakar, Nicholas P., *Belorussia: The Making of a Nation*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1956, p. 122.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 132.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 141.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 174.

13. Ibid., p. 192.
14. Ibid., p. 212.
15. Ibid., p. 215.
16. Ibid., p. 220.

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(Працяг з бач. 15)

дзенага аб'екту з мэтай прысваення сабе новых мэтадаў ацэны з'явішчаў і рэакцыі на іх.

У вапошній ацэне "Навінаў" можна сьцьвердзіць факт, што яны стаюцца для нас ваіном, праз якое найляпей відно жыццё і думка беларускага савецкага чалавека, тым болей гэта важна, што ня кажны з нас мае магчымасьць перагляду лічных публікацыяў БССР.

"Навіны" маглі-б стацца болей паважнымі, калі-б былі споўненыя дзьве прадмовіны:

* 6 — 8 бачын машынапісу гэта за скромны фармат. Яны павінны мець мінімум хаця-б 16 бачын друку.

* Вонкавы выгляд — рататарны друк, памерам лістовага аркуша, — чыніць адпыхаючае ўражаньне. Мы ня хочам гэтым сказаць, што як раз гэты рататарны друк тэхнічна нядобры. Мы аднак хочам сказаць, што друкаваньне нармальным друкарскім працэсам, наданьня "Навінам" выгляду нармальнага друку, бязумоўна, падняло-б прэстыж публікацыі ў вачох чытача і ўчыніла-б яе болей атрактнай.